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INTRODUCTION
This comment marks the fourth attempt of the Review to summarize and
explain the year's developments in the complex and protean field of federal
labor relations law.* The subject matter comprises, for the most part, recent
decisions of the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, and the Labor Board.
If any discernible trend in federal labor relations policy appears in the
past year's decisions, it is this. Organized Labor and Management should
settle their differences at the bargaining table, without resort to administra-
tive processes. In bargaining, the parties are free to use all economic weapons
at their command, so long as they do not transgress the specific prohibitions
of the National Labor Relations Act. Perhaps, this trend manifests a federal
policy of intruding no further into the private relationships of employer and
union than is authorized by a literal reading of the act. Perhaps, also, this
trend reflects increasing maturity and a growing sense of responsibility on the
part of both Labor and Management in their dealings with each other and
the general public.
* The prior comments arc; Recent Developments in Labor Law, 5 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 629 (1964); Recent Developments in Labor Law, 4 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L,
Rev., 661 (1963); Labor's New Frontier: The End of the Per Se Rules, 3 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 487 (1962).
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JURISDICTION
A. BOARD PREEMPTION OF STATE LIBEL .SUITS
Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon,' state and federal courts have deferred to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board when an activity is argu-
ably subject to section 7 or section 8 of the act. 2 One recently preempted area
is that of libel arising out of the labor-management relationship and its
related activities. The leading state court decision finding preemption is
Blum v. International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL-C10, 5 while the principal
federal court case is Linn v. Local 114, United Plant Guard Workers. 4 Both
cases declared that the activity in question is within one of the areas of con-
duct which must be free from state regulation if national policy is to be left
unhampered.
Shortly after the Blum and Linn decisions, however, there appeared a
trend away from preemption in the defamation area. One of two recent deci-
sions finding no preemption is Brantley v. Devereaux. 5 There, the union's
vice-president sued the employer for slanderous statements made during a
collective bargaining session. The federal district court held that the action
was not preempted. Blum was distinguished on the ground that it involved
libelous material distributed by the union during an organizational campaign.
The Blum court had held that whether a union has abused its right under
section 7 to distribute printed matter rests within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Board.
The Brantley court pointed out that while the activity in Blum was
arguably subject to sections 7 and 8 of the act, slanderous statements by an
employer during a collective bargaining session could only be regarded as
evidence of a violation of the good faith bargaining duty imposed by section
8(a) (5), or evidence of illegal coercion in violation of section 8(a) (1).
Or they might be protected by the free speech guarantee of section 8(c) .
1 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
2 Section 7 of the Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958), reads in
pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection....
Section 8 of the Act, 61 Stat. 140-43 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958), defines certain
employer and union unfair labor practices, in addition to providing for free speech as
follows:
(c) The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute
or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this
subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit.
3 42 N.J. 389, 201 A.2d 46 (1964).
4 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964), petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. Week 3247 (U.S.
Jan. 9, 1965) (No. 819).
5 237 F. Supp. 156 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
Brantley v. Devereaux, id. at 159, 160. Whether section 8(c), supra note 2,
protects such statements (in so far as they may not constitute evidence of an unfair
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The court drew another distinction between statements occurring during
an organizational campaign and remarks made during the course of collective
bargaining. In the former situation, the "employer and union are permitted
to use biased propaganda to publicize their respective positions . . . whereas
in a collective bargaining session both union representatives and employer
are charged by law with the duty of bona fide, good faith bargaining. . . . 17
Therefore, the court concluded that it was not bound by Blum or the
other cases cited by the employer advocating preemption!' The court then
made an independent determination of the preemption issue. It found that
the libelous conduct was not arguably subject to sections 7 and 8 of the act,
and held that the libel action was not preempted because it did not involve
regulation of labor relations, or concern the merits of a labor dispute.
Even if the libel was "arguably subject" to the act, the court found that
it came within the first of two exceptions enunciated in Garmon. Speaking
for the Supreme Court in Garmon, Mr. Justice Frankfurter had declared that
due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system
.. . has required us not to find withdrawal from the states of
power to regulate where [1] the activity regulated was a merely
peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act. See
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
Or where [2] the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of
compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress
had deprived the States of the power to act . 9
In finding the first exception applicable, the court in Brantley analogized
the libel action to a suit for damages arising out of violence in a labor dis-
pute. If the state court has jurisdiction there, 1 ° then it should have it in a
libel suit where the damage to reputation can be more extensive than a
physical injury. 11
labor practice) apparently is for the Board to decide in the first instance. This is opposed
to what the court in Brantley seemed to feel, and contra to the argument in note 8, infra.
7 Id. at 160.
8
 The court never referred to Schnell Tool & Die Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 200
N.E.2d 727 (Ohio C.F. 1964), where the employer sued a union member for libelous
statements made during a collective bargaining session. The Ohio court had found that
the suit was preempted, despite the argument that section 8(c), supra note 2, sur-
rendered the Board's exclusive jurisdiction by guaranteeing that the expression of any
opinion would not be evidence of an unfair labor practice.
D San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, supra note 1, at 243-44. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter cited for the second exception United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356
U.S. 634 (1958).; Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) ; United Automobile
Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). He explained that in these cases the states had been
allowed to award damages and injunctions for "conduct marked by violence and im-
minent threats to the public order • .. because the compelling state interest, in the scheme
of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the absence
of clearly expressed congressional direction." Id. at 247.
10
 Brantley v. Devereaux, supra note 5. at 161. The court cited Hall v. Walters,
226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E.2d 729, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 953 (1955).
11
 Ibid. In Linn v. Local 114, United Plant Guard Workers, supra note 4, at 71,
the Sixth Circuit admitted the existence of extensive damage:
817
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Although the reasoning of the Brantley court sounds more like the sec-
ond exception to the Garmon rule, the court purported to discuss only the
first exception. The second exception, however, was the basis for jurisdiction
in the other recent libel case holding no preemption. Meyer v. Local 107,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters12 involved a suit by union officers for damages arising
from the printing of libelous material in another union's newspaper. The
tabloid was specially issued during a campaign preceding an NLRB repre-
sentation election.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had no difficulty in reaching "the
conclusion that our state courts are not precluded from exercising jurisdiction
over libel actions arising from labor activities." 13 The court made no attempt
to distinguish Blum and the other libel cases, as did the court in Brantley.
Indeed, it would have been quite difficult to distinguish Blum and Linn on
their facts, since the suit in Meyer arose from the same kind of labor activity,
i.e., an organizational campaign prior to a Board election.
Rather than distinguish the cases holding preemption of libel suits, the
Meyer court relied directly on the second exception to the Garmon rule. It
held that even if "the activities of the defendants in the present case are
arguably subject to Section 7 or 8 of the Act, . . . there is a compelling
state interest, especially in the maintenance of domestic peace, upon which
state jurisdiction over a libel suit can be predicated!" 19
The court noted that libel is a crime at common law because of its
potential for inciting to violence and consequent breach of the peace.' 5 There-
fore, the "interest of the state in providing a peaceful forum to which indi-
viduals whose reputations have been damaged by false and injurious state-
ments can bring their claims should not be frustrated in the absence of a
clear expression of congressional intent." 15 And the court could discover no
clear expression of a congressional desire to deprive the states of this impor-
tant jurisdiction to redress individual wrongs. Furthermore, the Board can-
not adequately protect the state's interest, because libelous utterances may
often be deemed insignificant in relation to the labor issues involved. Accord-
ingly, they may not cause an election to be set aside.
Even if the libelous statements did persuade the Board to set aside an
It is indeed dear that physical assault and battery and libelous assault upon a
citizen's good name are both torts that cannot be compensated by a "cease and
desist" order of the NLRB. An individual might quickly recover from the
bruises and wounds of a physical assault and at little expense have a crumpled
fender bumped out, but a lifetime may not be sufficient to restore a reputation
hurt by the circulation of a vicious libel.
Nevertheless, the court held itself foreclosed from giving redress, stating: "We are
persuaded, however, that Garmon has drawn the distinction which permits the one to
be remedied by traditional court action and limits the other to the relief, if any, that
may come from an order of the NLRB." Id. at 71-72.
206 A.2d 382 (Pa. 1965).
33 Id, at 385.
14 Id. at 384-85.
15 Id. at 386 n.11, where the court quoted from the dissent of the three justice
minority in Blum, supra note 3.
10 Id. at 386.
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election, the court pointed out that the Board could do nothing to restore
the reputation of the defamed individual. The Board has no interest in pro-
tecting reputation; its task is to guarantee that the employees' freedom of
choice is not impeded by coercion, falsehood, or emotion. "On the other
hand, the state jurisdiction is not directed at regulation of labor relations
as such. The state concern is with injury to reputation and the discourage-
ment of violent reprisals.'" 7
One of the three dissenting justices in Meyer argued that a particular
state's interest in defamation occurring during a labor dispute is not great
enough to warrant submersion of the vital need for uniformity of federal
regulation of labor relations. But the majority reasoned that the only possi-
bility of friction and conflict arising from the coexistence of state and federal
jurisdiction is in the area of free speech. And the Supreme Court in Beau-
karnais v. Illinois's has already recognized that the right of free speech does
not preclude state jurisdiction to punish for libel.
Certainly, if the drastic state action of criminal libel is permissible under
the fourteenth amendment, a civil action for libel should not be preempted
merely because there is also a right of free speech. Of course, the delicate
balance between free speech and libel must be maintained, and it is possible
that justified criticism may be stifled under the guise of a libel action. Never-
theless, abuses can be avoided by the exercise of judicial authority."
IT Id. at 387. The court distinguished Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v.
Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963), and Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko,
373 U.S. 701 (1963). In both cases the worker sued his union in a state court for damages
for tortious interference with his right to have employment. In finding preemption, the
Supreme Court distinguished International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356
U.S. 617 (1958), as involving equitable relief directed at reinstatement in the union of
an illegally expelled member, rather than an interference with the individual's employ-
ment opportunity.
The Meyer court distinguished Borden and Perko as follows:
In both these cases the state was attempting to protect a worker's interest in his
job. This is obviously a matter of labor relations and is to be governed ex-
exclusively by federal law. In libel actions, however, the state is affording
protection of a citizen's interest in his reputation. The fact that the reputation
was injured in a labor dispute is merely incidental. In vindicating this compelling
interest—an interest close to its police power—the state is not responding to
considerations of labor policy at all.
Id. at 387 n.16, Accord, Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 1297, 1321 (1954), and Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee
Activities, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 667 (1961).
58 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
lv Beauharnais v, Illinois, id. at 263-64. The Meyer court pointed this out, supra
note 12, at 389. It also compared the libelous use of material in the organizational cam-
paign to a smear campaign in an election for public office.
In neither instance is there a purposeful social or public need to encourage such
irrelevant and harmful activity by granting absolute protection against deliberate
libel at the expense of fundamental state interests by withdrawing state jurisdic-
tion so that intentional libel may be privileged and unrestrained.
Id. at 387 n.13.
The court did not consider the point raised in Brantley, that an employer and a
union are allowed to use biased propaganda in an organizational campaign (referred to at
note 7, supra). However, there is undoubtedly a distinction between propaganda and
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The majority in Meyer then quickly disposed of the remaining issue of
whether the plaintiffs should have exhausted internal union remedies before
seeking judicial relief. They affirmed the rule that, in the absence of any real
internal remedy, an individual need not exhaust intra-association appeals and
procedures. 2 °
The result in Meyer appears to be not only the most equitable, but also
the most logical. The problem that the preemption doctrine seeks to avoid
"is conflicting regulation of labor disputes by the State and Federal govern-
ments."21 It is difficult to see how the existence of state jurisdiction over a
libel suit arising from labor activities can have serious effect on federal labor
policy.22 Truly, libel is "merely a peripheral concern of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act," as urged in Brantley. In addition, it is an area that
deeply touches state concern, as advocated by Meyer. Thus, without com-
pelling congressional direction, it should not be inferred that the federal labor
laws allow an individual to libel with impunity.
Whether the Brantley-Meyer position will become the majority rule will
soon be determined by the growing number of decisions on this question.
In any event, the issue is ripe for Supreme Court clarification. 23
B. NLRA PREEMPTION OF SECTION 303 SUITS
In Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton' the Supreme Court has de-
clared that damage suits for conduct covered by section 303 2 are subject to
libel. And state regulation of the latter does not mean prevention or control of the
former in contravention of any federal labor policy.
20 Meyer v. Local 107, Teamsters Union, supra note 12, at 389-90.
21 Brantley v. Devereaux, supra note 5, at 160. (Emphasis in original.)
22 At most, the parties involved in labor activities would be constantly aware that if
they committed a libel they would be held to answer in a state court. It cannot be argued
that this minimal limitation on speech affects any federal labor policy. If an accommoda-
tion between slate and federal policies in the areas of speech and labor relations must be
reached, it can be achieved by according participants in labor relations a qualified
privilege, Thus, an alleged defamer would not be liable even for false statements of fact
if made for valid union or employer objectives, with an honest belief in their truthfulness.
See, Prosser, Torts § 110, at 811 n.34 (1964 ed.).
23 The circuits conflict. Opposed to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Linn v. Local 114,
United Plant Guard Workers, supra note 4, is the Fourth Circuit's decision in R. H.
Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 336 F.2d 160, 164-65 (1964), where the court held
that "the National Labor Relations Act is concerned only with the coercive effect of an
alleged libel and not with its character as a common law tort." As indicated in note 4,
supra, certiorari has been applied for in Linn.
1 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
2 The suit in Morton was brought under Section 303 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958), since the alleged illegal
conduct occurred prior to the 1959 amendment by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 545 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (Supp. V, 1964).
While "these amendments are not germane to the questions presented in [Mor-
ton] . . ." (Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, supra note 1, at 253-54 n.1), the
amended version is quoted as a matter of convenience:
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry or
activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any activity
820
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the total sweep of federal labor law preemption. In light of the delicate bal-
ance struck by section 303 in prohibiting only certain forms of secondary
pressure, the Court found a congressional intent to preclude all remedies
except the federal ones. 3
 As a result, it reversed the district court's allowance
of punitive damages and damages for conduct proscribed by Ohio law, al-
though permitted under federal law. The Court found that section 303 pro-
vides for no recovery beyond that of actual damages sustained.
Punitive damages for violations of § 303 conflict with the congres-
sional judgment, reflected both in the language of the federal statute
[see note 2] and in its legislative history [93 Cong. Rec. 4872-73
(1947)1, that recovery for an employer's business losses caused by
a union's peaceful secondary activities proscribed by § 303 should
be limited to actual, compensatory damages. And insofar as punitive
damages in this case were based on secondary activities which vio-
lated only state law, they cannot stand, because, as we have held,
substantive state law in this area must yield to federal limitations. 5
It should be pointed out that the secondary pressure applied by the
union was peaceful, thereby taking the case out of "the line of precedents
which have permitted state law to be applied in situations where union
activities involving violence were present."a
or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 8(b) (4) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any viola-
tion of subsection (a) may sue therefor in any district court of the United States
subject to the limitations and provisions of section 301 hereof without respect to
the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the
parties and shall recover the damages by him statained and the cost of the suit.
(Emphasis supplied.)
B
 Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, supra note 1, at 258-59. The Court said:
This weapon of self-help [secondary pressure], permitted by federal law, formed
an integral part of the petitioner's effort to achieve its bargaining goals during
negotiations with the respondent. Allowing its use is a part of the balance struck
by Congress between the conflicting interests of the union, the employees, the
employer and the community.. 	 If the Ohio law of secondary boycott can be
applied to proscribe the same type of conduct which Congress focused upon but
did not proscribe when it enacted § 303, the inevitable result would be to frus-
trate the congressional determination to leave this weapon of self-help available,
and to upset the balance of power between labor and management expressed in
our national labor policy.
Id. at 259-60.
4
 Morton v. Local 20, Teamsters Union, 200 F. Supp. 653 (ND. Ohio 1961), aff'd,
320 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1963).
5
 Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, supra note 1, at 260-61.
6
 Id. at 257. It should also be noted that one item of damage on which the Supreme
Court reversed the district court's allowance of recovery involved the direct persuasion
of a secondary employer to cease doing business with the primary employer. This form of
secondary pressure was permitted under the controlling 1947 version of section 303;
under the present version of section 303(a) (by way of section 8(b)(4),(ii)(B)), it
would be illegal if it involved economic or physical threats, coercion, or restraint. See
the section on secondary boycotts, infra p. 878.
821
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
ENFORCEMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
UNDER SECTION 301
A. OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON THE EMPLOYER
Since 1957, when the Supreme Court decided Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills,' state and federal courts have been fashioning a body of federal law
to govern actions under section 301.2 An important part of this federal law
is the "specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collec-
tive bargaining agreements." 8 This aspect represents a reversal of the com-
mon law rule of contracts, prohibiting the specific enforcement of arbitration
provisions. The philosophy behind this change is that "it will promote a
higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to such agreements, and will
thereby promote industrial peace."4
Yet, prior to 1960 the courts were very reluctant to compel arbitration.
That year the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers trilogy° decreed that "a
major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for
arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement," and that,
accordingly, apart from matters specifically excluded by the parties, all dis-
putes must be held to come within the scope of the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the contract.°
When the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract inter-
pretation to the arbitrator, the court's function is confined to ascertaining
whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is
governed by the contract.? When the parties have not so agreed, the question
whether one of them must arbitrate, "as well as what issues it must arbitrate,
is a matter to be determined by the Court on the basis of the contract entered
into by the parties." However, the interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement is a question for the arbitrator; a court has no right to overrule
his construction of the contract merely because its interpretation differs from
his.°
The federal policy favoring arbitration, as a means of promoting indus-
trial peace, moved another step in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 1 °
1 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
2
 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958):
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
3 Supra note 1, at 451.
4
 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1947).
5
 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S, 564 (1960) ; United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960),; United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
6 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 5, at 578, 581.
7 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., supra note 5, at 567, 568.
8
 Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962).
9
 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra note 5, at 598, 599.
'° 376 U.S. 543 (1964). For an extensive discussion of the case, see Note, 6 B.C.
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 344 (1965).
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where the Supreme Court once again abrogated traditional contract theory
to promote arbitration. In that case, Wiley had merged with a much smaller
corporation before the latter's collective bargaining contract had expired.
The contract did not expressly bind successors of the corporation, but the
union sued under section 301 to compel arbitration of grievances concerning
such subjects as seniority rights, severance and vacation pay, and the pension
plan. The Supreme Court held"
that the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does
not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered by
the agreement, and that, in appropriate circumstances, present here,
the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union
under the agreement.' 2 (Emphasis supplied.)
In light of this abrogation of the privity of contract rule, the unanimous
Court carefully pointed out that the rights allegedly subject to arbitration
would have to arise from the original contract with the old employer, and
that the union could not use arbitration to acquire new rights against Wiley. 13
The Court also emphasized that a new employer would not in all circum-
stances be bound by the arbitration provisions of the original contract. Where
a lack of any "substantial continuity of identity" existed in the business
enterprise before and after a change, the employer would not be bound. Fur-
ther, a union might abandon its right to arbitration by failing to make its
claims known. Neither situation obtained here, where the union made its
position known well before the merger, and where the "similarity and con-
tinuity of operation across the change in ownership is adequately evidenced
by the wholesale transfer of [employees] . . without difficulty."' 4
Subsequent cases provide a fuller answer to the question of what circum-
stances will require the new employer to arbitrate under its predecessor's
11 The Court prefaced its holding with an affirmance of Atkinson, supra note 8, on
the issue of who is to decide whether the arbitration provisions survived the merger—the
court or the arbitrator. In choosing the former, the Court reasoned that
The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission to
arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that the collective bargaining
agreement does in fact create such a duty.
Supra note 10, at 547.
At a later point, the Court made it clear that the question of "procedural arbitra-
bility," i,e., whether procedural conditions to arbitration have been met, must be decided
by the arbitrator and not the courts. To hold otherwise "would thus not only create the
difficult task of separating related issues, but would also produce frequent duplication of
effort." Id. at 558.
12 Id. at 548. The Court observed that the federal policy of settling labor disputes by
arbitration would certainly be hurt if a change in the ownership of a business
had the automatic consequence of removing a duty to arbitrate previously
established. . . . The objectives of national labor policy . . . require that the
rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their business and even
eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by some protection to the em-
ployees from a sudden change in the employment relationship.
Id. at 549.
13 Id. at 555.
14 Id. at 551.
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contract. Since Wiley, three circuit courts of appeals handled this question
within a single month.
The Third' 5
 and Ninth Circuits" directed arbitration where the sale
of all the assets of the predecessor to the successor resulted in a change of
ownership that had negligible impact on the workers. In both cases there
were no geographical shifts of employees, and the employment remained sub-
stantially unchanged. These factors placed both cases within the Wiley syn-
drome, where there is a substantial continuity of identity in the business enter-
prise after the change. Although the Wiley Court did not specifically call this
criterion' 7
 the sole determinant of arbitrability, the briefs of all the parties
agreed that it should be the test." The only other eventuality listed by the
Court, where arbitration would not be imposed, occurs where "a union might
abandon its right to arbitration by failing to make its claims known.'" 9
Arguably, the latter is an estoppel-lathes type of rule for the union, and
has no bearing on whether the initial test of substantial continuity of identity
in the business enterprise is met. In fact, the Third Circuit in Reliance did
not even consider the union's failure to make known its claims until after the
change in ownership.2° This is probably the right approach: the successor
employer certainly must be aware of the existence of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, and it can reasonably expect the union to demand that it honor
provisions relating to settlement of grievances, even if it entails arbitration.
Under the substantial continuity of identity test, both Reliance and
Wackenhut presented clearer cases for imposing a duty to arbitrate than
Wiley itself. In the former there were no geographical shifts of workers to
the successors' plants, as in Wiley.
A much closer situation confronted the Seventh Circuit in Piano Workers
v. W. W. Kimball, Co., a plant-removal case. 21 Here, ownership did not
change, but the court discussed Wiley because the employer argued the lack
of an arbitrable difference with the union over the lay-off provisions, since
15
 United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (1964).
16
 Wachenhut Corp. v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d
954 (1964).
17
 The Court said:
there may be cases in which the lack of any substantial continuity of identity in
the business enterprise before and after a change would make a duty to arbitrate
something imposed from without, not reasonably to be found in the particular
bargaining agreement and the acts of the parties involved.
Supra note 10, at 551.
15
 Wiley's reply brief agreed with the union when it stated:
whether Wiley can be bound by the obligation to arbitrate contained in the .. .
collective bargaining agreement turns on whether the "industrial community has
remained substantially intact, or whether the change in ownership has been
accompanied by so many other changes in the nature of the enterprise that the
industrial community cannot be said to have survived." (Amicus Br., p. 13).
Reply Brief for the Petitioner, p. 10.
no John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, supra note 10, at 551.
20 United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., supra. note 15. This latter point
has increased importance since the successor employer in the contract for sale expressly
disclaimed any liability under the prior collective bargaining contract.
21 Piano Workers v. W. W. Kimball Co., 333 F.2d 761 (1964).
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the contract had terminated. The court disagreed, quoting Wiley to the effect
that seniority and lay-off provisions may create rights realizable after the
termination of the contract, and that, therefore, arbitration over these rights
may be ordered even after the contract has ended.22
The court then applied the Wiley test of substantial continuity of iden-
tity in the business enterprise, and denied arbitration. In so doing, the court
indicated that in Wiley the geographical shift of workers was only from one
part of New York City to another, while Piano Workers involved a shift
from a Chicago suburb to southern Indiana. In addition, the operation at
the new plant "was relevantly dissimilar from the operation in Chicago." 23
The court also relied on the union's refusal to give the employer a list
of the thirty-nine laid-off employees desirous of jobs at the new Indiana plant.
Without the list, the employer argued, it could not comply with the contract's
seniority and lay-off provisions, because it did not know who wanted jobs.'
Although the court used this factor as a supporting reason, it appears
that it was swayed by the equities of a situation where the union refused
to cooperate. Had the union cooperated, the court might have had a more
difficult time distinguishing Wiley, and might have decided that an inter-city
shift of workers did not necessarily fail to meet the substantial continuity
of identity in the business enterprise test.
It is highly questionable whether geography becomes an important factor
in a plant removal with no change of employer. In determining whether the
employer should be held to arbitrate claims under an expired contract, the
court should not consider whether he has moved one or a thousand miles away.
The matter involves interpretation of the expired contract—not a considera-
tion of whether the privity rule of contracts should be abrogated. Privity
already exists. Furthermore, if one of the claims is that the employer should
offer jobs to its former employees, the distance between locations should not
be relevant in determining whether he should make the offer, even though it
may be relevant to the employee's consideration of the offer.
On the other hand, with a successor employer, the geographical factor
is more important in determining sufficient continuity of identity in the
business enterprise to compel the employer to arbitrate claims under the
predecessor's contract.
The court in Piano Workers seems to have erred in applying the Wiley
test to a case lacking a new employer. The test was created by Wiley to
decide only whether traditional contract theory should be abrogated by
compelling an employer to arbitrate under a contract to which he was not
a party. By applying the Wiley test to a case not involving a new employer,
the court treated a party to the collective bargaining contract as though he
were a stranger. Instead of interpreting the contract and applying contract
law, it permitted the employer to avoid the continuing obligations that he
22 Id . a t 764 .
23 Id. at 765.
24 The court did not consider whether or not the employer should have offered jobs
solely on the basis of seniority, as the contract provided, without first determining
whether the individual employee desired employment. This is probably what the union
desired, and why it refused to tender the list.
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might have had under the expired contract, merely because he moved his
plant.
Left unanswered by Wiley and its successor cases is the important ques-
tion whether the subsequent employer must not only submit to arbitration,
but must also assume the whole contract. Reliance and Wackenhut suggest
in dicta that where the successor takes over intact the entire operation of his
predecessor, he should be bound by the whole contract.
The Reliance court pointed out that Wiley recognized that new circum-
stances created by the acquisition of the business may make it inequitable
and unreasonable to require the parties to adhere strictly to every term of
the prior collective bargaining contract. Nevertheless, the court added, the
contract should remain the basic charter of labor relations. Within this frame-
work, an arbitrator might consider any new circumstances "in achieving a
just and equitable settlement of the grievance at hand." 25
The court in Wackenhut went further and viewed Wiley as holding that
with a substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise, "a collec-
tive bargaining agreement containing an arbitration provision, entered into
by the predecessor employer is binding upon the successor employer."26
Although Wiley did not so hold, it can be the basis for such a result.
The better approach, however, is that taken by Reliance, which gives the
arbitrator discretion to reach an equitable solution, using the prior collective
bargaining agreement only as a guideline.
B. OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON THE EMPLOYEE
While the courts have been developing the doctrine of compulsory arbi-
tration under section 301, they have increasingly recognized the individual
worker's rights under the collective bargaining contract.' The two areas,
however, are not mutually exclusive. Employee rights are bound to clash at
25
 United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., supra note 15, at 895.
20
 Wachenhut Corp. v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers, supra
note 16, at 958. In doing so, the court recognized that it had alternative grounds upon
which to base its opinion; i.e., it could have required arbitration on the grounds of
novation and estoppel. The trial court had found that, subsequent to the sale, the suc-
cessor agreed to fulfill its predecessor's obligations under the collective bargaining
contract. Id. at 958.
1 The increasing volume of articles on this subject illustrates this concern, e.g.,
Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50
Colum. L. Rev. 730 (1950); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601
(1956); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 151 (1957) ; Blumrosen,
Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus Employee
Autonomy, 13 Rutgers L. Rev. 631 (1959) ; Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective
Labor Relations, 45 Cornell L.Q. 25 (1959) ; Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of
Fair Representation, 22 Ohio St. L.J. 39 (1961) ; Summers, Individual Rights in Collec-
tive Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 362 (1962) ; Aaron, Reflections on
the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532 (1962) ;
Kovarsky, Unfair Labor Practices, Individual Rights and Section 301, 16 Vand. L. Rev.
595 (1963) ; Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agree-
ment—A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 Yale L.J. 421 (1963); Rosen,
Individual Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Look at the Problem, 24
Md. L, Rev. 233 (1964).
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some point with the arbitration rights of the union and management. This
clash finally occurred in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,2 with the union
and management winning the first round.
To understand the Maddox decision, it is necessary to review briefly the
evolution of employee rights under section 301. The starting point is Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n,3 which overruled Employees v. Westinghouse Corp..'
as "no longer authoritative as a precedent." 5 Having decided in Westinghouse
that section 301 did not grant jurisdiction to hear individual complaints of
contract breaches, the Supreme Court reversed itself in Evening News, hold-
ing that such jurisdiction existed, regardless of whether the contract rights
were those of management, of union, or of an individual employee.° Still, the
court held open the question of which breaches of contract are actionable by
an employee, declaring:
we need not consider the question of federal law of whether peti-
tioner, under this contract, has standing to sue for breach of the no-
discrimination clause nor do we deal with the standing of other
employees to sue upon other clauses in other contracts.?
The Court partially answered this question the following year in
Humphrey v. Moore. 8 Moore sought, in a state court, to enjoin implementa-
tion of a joint grievance committee's decision to dovetail the seniority list of
his company with that of another company leaving the area. He alleged that
the committee decision, which would result in loss of his job, breached the
collective bargaining contract between his union and employer, because the
committee exceeded its authority in making the decision and because the union
dishonestly influenced the decision in violation of its duty of fair repre-
sentation.
In denying relief, the Supreme Court unanimously held that Moore had
failed to prove his case on the merits. All the Justices agreed that the com-
mittee had not exceeded its authority and that the union had not breathed its
duty of fair representation. But the Court split sharply on the jurisdictional
issue whether under these circumstances an employee could bring a breach
of contract action under section 301.
A majority of five Justices summarily disposed of this issue by refusing
to discuss it and proceeding directly to the merits. Mr. Justice White, writing
for the majority, stated: "if we assume with Moore and the Courts below
that . . . [the committee's] interpretation of the section is open to court
review, Moore's cause is not measurably advanced." 9 (Emphasis supplied.)
2 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
a 371 U.S. 195 (1962), noted, 4 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 766 (1963).
4 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, supra note 3, at 199.
Id. at 200. That elements of unfair labor practices were present which would
ordinarily be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB was irrelevant. Id. at 197.
7 Id. at 200, 201 n.9.
8 375 U.S. 335 (1964), noted 5 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 848 (1964).
11 Id. at 345. Mr. Justice Harlan, in agreeing with the majority, directly treated the
issue. He argued that when the union is charged with departing from the collective
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Mr. Justice Goldberg, on the other hand, speaking for a minority of
three, strongly disagreed that Moore had stated a cause of action arising
under section 301. Rather, "Moore's claim must be treated as an individual
employee's action for a union's breach of its duty of fair representation—a
duty derived not from the collective bargaining contract but from the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. . . ."" Mr. Justice Goldberg also thought that
a dissenting employee could not challenge a mutually acceptable grievance
settlement between an employer and a union, even if the settlement inter-
preted or amended the contract."
Nevertheless, the majority in Moore permitted an individual employee
to sue under section 301. He, however, had first exhausted the grievance
procedure. What would have happened if he had ignored the grievance ma-
chinery entirely, and proceeded on his own to sue the employer under section
301? Would the Court still have recognized the employee's suit?
Smith v. Evening News suggested that it would not. There, the employee
sued for wages lost when the company allegedly violated the non-discrimina-
tion clause of the contract. The Court noted initially that "there was no
grievance arbitration procedure in this contract which had to be exhausted
before recourse could be had to the courts. Compare Atkinson v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238; Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American
Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254." 12
 It is doubtful that the Court would have
mentioned the absence of contractual provision for exhaustion of grievance
procedures, had it not considered the availability and use of such procedures
determinative of the question of individual procedural standing under section
301, at least where the parties designated the grievance machinery the exclu-
sive means of redress. Further, the Court's citation of Sinclair Refining and
Drake Bakeries indicated that it would, in a proper case, hold an employee
precluded from maintaining a suit under section 301 until he has exhausted
his internal remedies, whether or not the contract provides for the grievance
machinery as the exclusive mode of redress for employee grievances.'3
The Court so held this year in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox. Maddox,
who lost his job when the employer closed down one of its mines, ignored
the contract grievance procedure and brought a state court suit against the
employer for severance pay allegedly due him under the terms of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The Court held:
federal labor policy requires that individual employees wishing to
assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance
bargaining agreement, "I can see no reason why an individually affected employee may
not step into the shoes of the union and maintain a § 301 suit himself." Id. at 359.
10 Id. at 351. Mr. Justice Goldberg stated: "I read the decisions of this Court to
hold that an individual employee has a right to a remedy against a union breaching its
duty of fair representation.. .." Id. at 355-56.
11
 Id. at 353.
12
 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, supra note 3, at 196 n.1.
13 Drake and Sinclair held that where the employer and union intend a subject to be
appropriate for arbitration, they must exhaust the arbitration procedure before bringing
a section 301 suit.
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procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of re-
dress. [Emphasis in original.]
[But this] rule would not of course preclude Maddox' court suit if
the parties to the collective bargaining agreement expressly agreed
that arbitration was not the exclusive remedy. 14 (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
The holding in Maddox is analogous to the Court's arbitration doctrine
that, apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all questions
on which the parties disagree must come within the scope of the contractual
grievance arbitration procedure. It also comports with the obligation, under
Drake Bakeries and Sinclair Refining, of the employer and union to exhaust
internal remedies before maintaining a section 301 suit. Maddox, then, places
an aggrieved employee in the same position, for purposes of procedural stand-
ing, as an aggrieved employer or union.
The Court's strivings towards legal symmetry under section 301 appear
in this case to contravene the proviso to section 9(a) of the act.'s Read
literally, this proviso indicates that the employee has the right to present his
grievance individually to the employer without interference from the union."
The legislative history of the proviso, moreover, supports this strict inter-
pretation.' 7
The Court, however, thought that requiring the employee to attempt to
use the grievance procedure was not contrary to the section 9(a) proviso.
Supra note 2, at 652, 657-58.
15 LMRA § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958), states:
Representatives . • selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees . • . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such griev-
ances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as
long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective bargain-
ing contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining
representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
(Emphasis supplied.)
16 This is so, unless the word "adjustment," as used in section 9(a), refers to the
whole procedure that the employee goes through, rather than to the results of the
negotiations with the employer. The latter interpretation is the more probable.
17 The congressional reports and debates reveal an intent to allow the individual
employee to present his grievance directly to the employer. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 24 (1947) ; H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 34 (1947); H.R. Rep.
No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1947); 93 Cong. Rec. 3624-25, 4904 (1947).
Congress' fear that Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945), decided
under the Wagner Act, had denied the employee direct access to the employer lends
further support to a literal interpretation of the proviso. Moreover, Congress was aware
of the Supreme Court's decision on the Railway Labor Act in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern
Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946), where the
union was denied the right to settle the grievances of a group of employees without their
authorization.
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Its only reason for this view was a citation to Black-Clawson Co. v. Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists."
In Black-Clawson, a discharged employee, who had completed the pre-
liminary steps of the grievance procedure, demanded that the employer sub-
mit to arbitration. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
the collective bargaining agreement (typical in language and structure of
many such agreements) gave the employee no right to compel arbitration.i°
Not content to stop here, the court proceeded to discuss the right of grievance.
It reasoned that
despite Congress' use of the word "right" [in the section 9(a) pro-
viso] .. . we are convinced that the proviso was designed merely
to confer upon the employee the privilege to approach his employer
on personal grievances when his union reacts with hostility or
apathy.2°
It pointed out that the proviso was meant to be a buffer between the employee
and his union, so that the employer may hear the individual's grievances
without running afoul of section 9(a), which makes the union the exclusive
bargaining agent?'
Accordingly, the employee does not have the right to present his own
grievance to the employer. He may have that privilege, if the union and
employer "deem it consonant with the efficient handling of labor disputes to
repose power in the individual employee . . . [and they incorporate] such
a provision in clear language in the collective bargaining agreement." 22
In Maddox, the Supreme Court appears to have ratified Black-Clawson
and extended its reasoning to the situation where the individual worker
attempts to completely by-pass the grievance machinery and sue on the
contract. The Court's logic is unassailable. Grant the premise that the indi-
vidual worker has no unqualified right to press his own grievance against
the employer and no personal standing to invoke the contract grievance
machinery, including arbitration, then it follows that he cannot, without at
least attempting to exhaust his internal remedies, sue the employer for a
'' 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
19
 Id. at 184. The court continued: "... this conclusion must be reached by applying
federal law and by resorting to reasoned state precedent for guidance." Ibid.
20 Id. at 185. Note that it has also been ruled that the act does not make it an
unfair labor practice for the employer to refuse to entertain grievances from individual
employees. Adm. Ruling, Gen. Counsel, Case No. 317 (1952), 30 L.R.R.M. 1103,
21 The court added a policy reason to its decision when it argued that: "Chaos
would result if every disenchanted employee, every disturbed employee, and every
employee who harbored a dislike for his employer, could harass both the union and the
employer by processing grievances through the various steps of the grievance pro-
cedure...." Supra note 18, at 186.
22
 Ibid, It has been assumed in the above discussion that an individual's seeking
"arbitration" of his grievance is no different from his merely presenting his grievance to
the employer for redress. This assumption is based on the concept of arbitration, as
evolved in labor law (see preceding section), and on the Supreme Court's decision in
United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), where the Court
held that, apart from matters which the parties specifically exclude, all questions on
which the parties disagree must come within the scope of the grievance and arbitration
procedure of the collective bargaining contract.
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breach of contract on a claim that falls within the contract grievance pro-
cedure. The only quarrel one might have with the Court's treatment of the
problem in Maddox is that it gives short shrift to the problem of employee
rights under collective bargaining agreements and Congress' attempt to deal
with this problem in the proviso to section 9(a). The meaning and proper
scope of this proviso, one would have thought, was far from settled. 23 Yet,
considering the facts in Maddox—a suit for severance pay after the employee
had been permanently discharged—a full appreciation of what the Court has
done emerges: every conceivable contractual claim that an employee may
have against his employer is swept into the contract grievance procedure
unless the contract expressly provides otherwise. Absent apathetic or hostile
treatment at the hands of his union, the employee is remitted to his internal
remedies and turned away from the courts.
The reason for the decision in Maddox is familiar: the promotion of
harmonious and stable industrial relations by means of collective bargaining.
True, Maddox was no longer an active citizen of the industrial community
governed by the collective bargaining agreement, but "it does not follow that
the resolution of his claim can have no effect on future relations between the
employer and other employees."24 A contrary rule, the Court reasoned,
would deprive employer and union of the ability to establish a uni-
form and exclusive method for orderly settlement of employee
grievances. If a grievance procedure cannot be made exclusive, it
loses much of its desirability as a method of settlement. A rule
creating such a situation "would inevitably exert a disruptive in-
fluence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective
agreements."25
While the majority of the Court was obviously more concerned with
the rights of the union and employer, Mr. Justice Black, the sole dissenter,
argued that the individual employee was being denied his day in court. He
did not think that the severance claim was a "grievance!'" Even assuming
23 For an excellent discussion of section 9(a), see Comment, Federal Protection of
Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73 Yale L.J. 1215 (1964).
24 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, supra note 2, at 656. The Court added that
even if the claim arose out of the plant's permanently shutting down, "the inability of
the union and employer at the contract negotiation stage to agree upon arbitration as the
exclusive method of handling permanent shutdown severance claims in all situations
could have an inhibiting effect on reaching an agreement." Ibid. The Court also pointed
out that the union's status as exclusive bargaining representative is enhanced by allowing
it to participate actively in the continuing administration of the contract, and that its
prestige with the employees will increase if it handles grievance claims conscientiously. At
the same time, the employer's best interests are served by limiting the choice of remedies
available to aggrieved employees. Id. at 653.
25 Id. at 653.
26 Although "grievance" is a word that has many meanings in many contexts, the
collective bargaining contract will usually define it and provide how a grievance is to be
processed under the grievance procedure. Mr. Justice Black failed to note this, although
he did quote the contract, part of which read: "Any Employee who has a complaint may
discuss the alleged complaint with his Foreman in an attempt to settle it. Any complaint
not so settled shall constitute a grievance within the meaning of this Section, 'Adjustment
of Grievances.'" Id. at 660-61 n.2.
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that it was a grievance, to say that the employee freely chose the grievance
machinery as the mode of settling his contractual claims would be a "trans-
parent and cruel fiction." Further, even if the employee had agreed to such
a procedure, it should not be enforced against him.27
 Finally, Mr. Justice
Black felt that requiring the employee to submit his claim to the grievance
procedure would not promote industrial peace."
Under the exclusive remedy doctrine, the employee is not deprived of
all his rights. If the union wrongfully refuses to press his claim or only goes
through the motions of the grievance procedure, the individual has available
at least two forms of redress. He may sue the employer and his union under
section 301, alleging a breach of contract. 2° Or he may cause an unfair labor
practice charge to be brought against the union for a breach of its duty of
fair representation."
C. OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON THE UNION
Concurrent with the expansion of the employer's obligation to arbitrate
and the employee's obligation to follow the established grievance procedure
is the increasing responsibility of the union not to strike over a grievance
dispute. A recent case guaranteeing that the union will meet its contract obli-
gation not to strike is American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs. 1 In a 2 to 1 decision, the Third Circuit held, inter alia,
that the employer could bring a state court action to enjoin, under state
law, the union's violation of a no-strike provision of the collective bargaining
contract.
The court's decision represents an attempt to give the employer his due.
In 1957, Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills declared that the employer's agree-
ment to arbitrate grievance disputes was the quid pro quo for the union's
agreement not to strike. 2 In Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court held that a
union could specifically enforce the employer's agreement to arbitrate. It also
implied that the employer could specifically enforce the union's promise not
to strike, i.e., that he could obtain an injunction against a union that vio-
lated the no-strike provision of the contract.3
27 Id. at 665. At this point, Mr. Justice Black drew an analogy to the inability of an
insurance company to enforce a contract made with its insured to arbitrate all disputes
which might arise in the future. He cited Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 386 (1868).
28
 Id. at 666.
29 Humphrey v. Moore, supra note 8.
39 See the discussion of the union's duty of fair representation, as developed by the
Board in Miranda Fuel, 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), and Hughes Tool,
147 N.L.R.B. No. 166, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964). Infra p. 890.
1 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. Week 3296 (U.S. March 8,
1965). For an extensive discussion of this case, see Note, 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 957
(1965).
2 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
3
 Ibid. The Court said:
[T]he [section 3011 legislation does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal
courts over labor organizations. It expresses as federal policy that federal courts
should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and
that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way. (Emphasis supplied.)
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In 1960, the Supreme Court, in the Steelworkers trilogy,4 reaffirmed its
quid pro quo doctrine. But, by expanding the employer's obligation to arbi-
trate, the Court disturbed the balance .° The balance was restored in 1962
in Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co. There, the Supreme Court
held, in effect, that it is not necessary to have an express contractual pro-
hibition of the right to strike. A no-strike provision will be implied as the
necessary equivalent to an agreement to arbitrate.°
This equilibrium was short-lived, however: in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkin-
son, decided three months later, the Supreme Court held that an employer,
who sued in a federal court to enforce a no-strike provision of a collective
bargaining agreement, was barred from obtaining an injunction by Section 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 7 Left unanswered, as Mr. Justice Brennan
pointed out, writing for the three dissenting Justices, was the question
whether the prohibition against injunctive relief should be carried over to
state courts as a part of the federal law governing collective bargaining con-
tracts.°
Mr. Justice Brennan explained that in attempting to answer this ques-
tion, the Court would be caught on the horns of a dilemma. If the Norris-
LaGuardia Act's prohibition of injunctive relief were carried over to the
state courts, section 301 would have an effect opposite to that intended.
Section 301 was "plainly designed to enhance the responsibility of unions
to their contracts, [but it] will have had the opposite effect of depriving
employers of a state remedy they enjoyed prior to its enactment."° On the
other hand, if state courts remained free to grant injunctions under the above
circumstances,
the development of a uniform body of federal contract law is in for
hard times. . . . Ironically, state rather than federal courts will be
the preferred instruments to protect the integrity of the arbitration
process, which Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers decisions forged
into a kingpin of federal labor policy. Enunciation of uniform doc-
trines applicable in such cases will be severely impeded. Moreover,
the type of relief available in a particular instance will turn on
fortuities of locale and susceptibility to process—depending upon
which States have anti-injunctive statutes and how they construe
them. 1 °
The obvious solution of this dilemma is congressional amendment to
4 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960) ; United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) ; United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
5 See the preceding section on "Obligations Imposed on the Employer."
369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962). The Court said: "a strike to settle a dispute which a
collective bargaining agreement provides shall be settled exclusively and finally by com-
pulsory arbitration constitutes a violation of the agreement." See Mr. Justice Black's
dissent, id. at HO.
7 370 U.S. 195, 203 (1962).
8 Id. at 226.
Ibid. (Emphasis in original.)
to Id. at 226-27.
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the Norris-LaGuardia Act, permitting federal courts to enjoin breaches of
the union's no-strike agreement. But the likelihood of such amendment in
the near future is slight. Besides the difficulty of getting a majority of Con-
gressmen to agree what the amendment should do, Congress would be justi-
fiably chary of tampering in any way with the body of law that the Supreme
Court has built up.
A less desirable, but more realistic, solution is to decide a policy as
between the two alternatives. Should the employer be returned part of his
quid pro quo by allowing a state court to grant an injunction against a union's
violation of its no-strike promise? Or, should the states be prohibited from
enjoining, in order to prevent forum-shopping and to preserve the uniform
character of the national labor law?
In choosing the first alternative, the Third Circuit, in American Dredging
Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, held that an employer's
state court action to enjoin a breach of a no-strike provision of a collective
bargaining contract was not removable to the federal district court. The
district court had accepted removal from a Pennsylvania court, and had
refused to remand on the ground that it had original jurisdiction under sec-
tion 301.11
 Thereafter, the district court refused injunctive relief to the
employer on the ground that Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.' 2
 de-
11 Section 1441 of the removal statute allows removal of a civil action of which a
federal district court has original jurisdiction under a law of the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441 (1958) reads as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to
the district court of the United States of the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or resi-
dence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of
the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the
State in which such action is brought.
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which
would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise
non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed
and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may
remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
12 Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104
(1958), reads as follows:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether
singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment;
.	 .	 .
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or
violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or
promise as is described in section 3 of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
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prived it of the power. But the district court did not think that the act
divested it of general jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Third Circuit gave section 4 a more literal reading."
It interpreted the term "jurisdiction" in the Norris-LaGuardia Act to mean
authority to entertain the suit, rather than power to grant equitable relief."
It therefore concluded that the case should have been remanded to the Penn-
sylvania court since the only relief sought by the employer's amended com-
plaint was an injunction."
This conclusion is hard to reconcile with Professor Chalet's argument
that, since the Norris-LaGuardia Act does permit the issuance of injunctions
under certain circumstances,'' the court must have jurisdiction in order to
determine whether those circumstances are present.I. 7 The majority of courts,
however, hold that removal to the federal courts should be denied because
"jurisdiction" means authority to take cognizance of the suit."
Even if the district court were not deprived of jurisdiction by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Third Circuit had another reason for denying
removal. The court argued that American Dredging did not arise under fed-
eral law, but was brought to enforce a state created right, and to obtain a
state remedy. Therefore, it was not removable.' 9 The dissenting judge con-
tended, however, that a suit of this type must necessarily arise under federal
law, because section 301 has superseded state law, and is the "exclusive
determinant of rights such as are asserted here between labor and manage-
ment under a collective bargaining contract in an industry affecting com-
merce."20
On this point the dissent is clearly right. The Supreme Court in Local
174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co. held that "suits of a kind covered
by section 301" are to be decided by federal labor law, because the subject
15 Mr. Justice Brennan in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, supra note 7, at 227, sug-
gested that this literal reading was possible, He recognized that removal might be a
method of avoiding state injunctions, but he pointed out that it would not be allowed if
section 4 was read literally.
14 The court cited several Supreme Court cases for its proposition that jurisdiction
is the power to take cognizance of a suit and render a binding decision. American
Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, supra note 1, at 840-42.
15 Before the employer amended his complaint he had asked for "such other relief
as the Court may deem appropriate." This would have been sufficient by itself to give
the district court jurisdiction, apart from any consideration of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. It is therefore essential for the employer to sue only for injunctive relief, so that
the case will not be removed to the federal court.
16 See the italicized part of section 4 (i), quoted, supra note 12. Section 7, 47 Stat.
71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958), also permits the issuance of injunctions under certain
circumstances.
17 Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 373 (1950).
18
 Direct Transit Lines, Inc. v. Starr, 219 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1955) ; National Dairy
Prods. Corp. v. Heffernan, 195 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Swift & Co. v. United
Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1959); contra, Direct Transit Lines,
Inc. v. Local 406, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 199 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1952).
19 American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, supra note 1,
at 842,
20 Id. at 857.
'835
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
matter covered by section 301 requires uniform law. 21 The Court thereby
extended the holding of Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, which had held
that, since section 301 provides that suits "may" be brought in federal courts,
there is concurrent jurisdiction in the state and federal courts. 22 In Dowd
Box there was no contention that the state law differed from the federal, and
therefore the question of which contract law the state court should apply—
state or federal—was left unanswered. Lucas Flour supplied the answer by
giving priority to the concept of uniformity. Thereafter in suits for violation
of a contract between employer and union (which are "suits of a kind
covered by section 301"), state courts would have to interpret and apply
federal law.
The Third Circuit assigned a third and final alternative ground for its
decision in American Dredging. The court argued that if it permitted removal
to the federal court, the employer would be deprived of the injunctive relief
available in the state court. 23 This assumes, of course, that the state would
regard the Norris-LaGuardia Act as not part of the federal labor policy which
has been fashioned since Lincoln Mills, and which must be applied to suits
under section 301.
On this point, the Third Circuit reasoned extensively that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act is not part of the federal labor policy. Its principal argument
was that, since Congress intended that the act apply only to the federal courts,
it would be an act of judicial legislation to hold that the state must apply
Norris-LaGuardia when it enforces federal labor policy. The court then dis-
cussed the decisions which have held that Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act does not extend to the states. 24 It concluded that, in any event, "the
question of limitation of state court jurisdiction here is appropriately one
for the decision of the Pennsylvania court and can be presented and deter-
mined there, subject, of course, to the ultimate reviewing power of the
Supreme Court of the United States." 25
Opposed to the Third Circuit's decision is Independent Oil Workers v.
Socony Mobil Oil Co., where the New Jersey Superior Court held that it
had concurrent jurisdiction of section 301 suits, but that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was part of the federal labor policy. 20 The better result, however, appears
to have been reached by the court in American Dredging. The Third Circuit's
argument that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not part of the federal labor
policy, but is instead a jurisdictional statute, denying the federal courts any
right to take cognizance of suits for injunctive relief, is plausible. Further-
21 Supra note 6, at 103.
22 368 U.S. 502, 506-08 (1962).
23 Supra note 1, at 846-48.
24
 Id, at 853. The court listed as "post-Sinclair" cases Curtis v. Tozer, 374 SAV.2d 557
(Mo. Ct. App. 1964) ; C. D. Perry & Sons, Inc. v. Robilotto, 39 Misc. 2d 147, 240 N.Y.S.2d
331 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Several "pre-Sinclair" cases listed were: McCarroll v. Los Angeles
County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Ca1.2d. 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 932 (1958) ; Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 382 Pa. 326, 115 A.2d 733, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 843 (1955).
25 American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, supra note 1,
at 856.
20 85 N .J .
 Super. 453, 205 A.2d 78 (1964).
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more, on a question as close as this, policy considerations become decisive.
By its decision, the Third Circuit adopted the policy of giving the employer
his side of the quid pro quo equation. In light of the importance attached
to the equation by the Supreme Court cases, this choice over the alternative
of a more uniform federal labor law is a reasonable one. In addition, the
policy of uniformity will be damaged only with respect to the nature of relief
that the court can decree."
Of course, under section 301 federal courts may still award money
damages for breach of collective bargaining contracts. Federal courts may
also stay an employer's federal court action for money damages for breach
of a no-strike clause when there is an arbitration clause binding both parties
to the contract. 28 It may be argued that, under similar circumstances, an
employer's suit for an injunction in a state court might also be stayed, pend-
ing arbitration.29 Still, even if the federal court may not stay the state court
action, and, because of American Dredging, cannot accept removal of the
state court suit, the Third Circuit chose the better of the two alternatives.
It now appears, in light of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, 30
that the decision in American Dredging will be given careful consideration.
Technically, denial of certiorari is "a decision only that the case is not an
appropriate one for consideration on the merits, and imports no adjudica-
tion."" "It simply means that fewer than four members of the Court deemed
it desirable to review a decision of the lower court as a matter 'of sound
judicial discretion.'"32 Nevertheless, American Dredging should help the
federal and state courts decide what the best policy should be." Unfortu-
27 Twenty-three states have some sort of anti-injunction statutes: Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 12-1808 (1956); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 31-112 to -121 (1962) ; Idaho Code Ann.
§§ 44-701 to -713 (1947); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 2a (1959) ; Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 40-501
to -514 (1952); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-1104 (1949); La. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-841 to -49
(1950) ; Me, Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 107, § 36 (1954) ; Md. Code Ann. art. 100, §§ 63-75
(1957) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 214, § 9A (1955) ; Minn. Stat. § 185.10 (1957) ; Mont.
Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-4203(8) (1947); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A: 15-51 to -58 (1951); N.Y.
Civ, Prac. Act § 876-76a, superseded by N.Y. Lab. Law § 807-08 (Supp. 1963); N.D.
Cert. Code § 34-08-05 (1943); Okla. Stat. tit. 40, § 166 (1951); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§§ 662.080-.090 (1961); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 206 (1952); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann.
§ 28-10-2 (1956) ; Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-1-28 to -34 (1953); Wash. Rev. Code
§§ 49.32.010-.910 (1961); Wis. Stat. § 133.07 (1959) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-239 to -245
(1957). Of these, only thirteen can properly be called "little Norris-LaGuardia acts."
These are: Conn., Idaho, La., Md., Mass., Minn., N.J., N.Y., Ore., Pa., Wash,, Wis.,
Wyo. Note that, even under a state's "little Norris-LaGuardia act," arbitrators may have
the power to include injunctions in their awards, and the courts may have to enforce
them. Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958).
New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 49 L.R.R.M. 2941 (1962).
28 Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
29 Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions,
63 Colum. L. Rev. 1027, 1038-39 (1963).
30 American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, supra
note 1.
31 Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 61 (1953).
32 Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917 (1950).
33 Subsequent to the American Dredging decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decided that Norris-LaGuardia's prohibition of labor injunctions did not extend to state
court suits for breaches of collective bargaining agreements. Shaw Elec. Co. v. IBEW,
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nately, this choice must be made until there is either Supreme Court action,
or a congressional amendment allowing federal and state courts to issue
injunctive relief in section 301 cases.
REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES
A. UNION'S RIGHT TO EQUAL TIME FOR PRE-ELECTION
SPEECH TO EMPLOYEES
Although coercive tactics, generally, have their place in labor-manage-
ment relations, they are inappropriate under the rules governing the conduct
of representation elections. These rules rest on the proposition that the elec-
torate should have the fullest possible opportunity to make a rational choice
on the merits. Consequently, equality of opportunity to communicate infor-
mation to the employees is an important prerequisite for a valid election.
The latest development in election rules is the Sixth Circuit's decision
in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB.' By enforcing the Board's order,2 the
court ruled that under certain circumstances the union has a right to equal
time to respond to the employer's speech on the employer's premises during
working hours.
The decision necessarily involved a balancing of the employees' right to
organize3 with the employer's right of free speech. 4
 Earlier cases had held
that the employer's right of free speech was not qualified by an obligation
to give the union equal time. Livingston Shirt Corp. enunciated the Board
rule that, absent either an unlawful broad no-solicitation rule or a privileged
broad no-solicitation rule, "an employer does not commit an unfair labor
Local 98, 208 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1965). Accord, Radio Corp. of America v. Local 780, Intl
Theatrical Stage Employees, 160 So. 2r1 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied,
33 U.S.L. Week 3347 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1965).
1
 339 F.2d 889 (1965).
2 Montgomery Ward & Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 846, 55 L.R.R.M. 1063 (1964).
3
 LMRA § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S,C. § 157 (1958), which reads in pertinent
part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection....
LMRA § 8(a), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S,C. § 158(a) (1958), which reads in pertinent
part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7... .
4 The constitutional protection of free speech in representation campaigns was
recognized in NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941). But the
limit of this first amendment right is reached when coercion is present. Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945).
The statutory right of free speech was enunciated by Congress in LMRA § 8(c), 61
Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958), which states:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute
or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this
Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.
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practice if he makes a pre-election speech on company time and premises to
his employees and denies the union's request for an opportunity to re-
ply. . . ." 5
 The Board in Livingston Shirt asserted that the parties' right to
equality of opportunity includes the lawful use of the customary media avail-
able to each. The employer's premises are his natural forum, just as the union
hall is the usual place for the union to address its members.
It should be noted that the employer's speech in Livingston Shirt was
noncoercive, and that his no-solicitation rule against activities for or against
a union during working time would be valid today.° The current Board
rules are summarized as follows:
An employer may forbid—
(1) the distribution of union literature by employees in working areas
during both working and non-working time;
(2) union solicitation during working time in any part of the plant.
But an employer may not forbid—
(1) employee distribution of union literature in non-working areas dur-
ing non-working time;
(2) union solicitation by employees on their own time, even in working
areas.
These tests merely determine presumptive validity or invalidity. A presump-
tively valid rule may become invalid if it is applied in a discriminatory man-
ner; a presumptively invalid rule may be proper if the employer can cite
special, justifying circumstances (e.g., a retail store where the employees are
in almost constant contact with the public). See Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co. 7
Tn determining whether the union should have equal time, what happens
if an employer not only applies his valid no-solicitation rule in a discrimina-
tory manner (which is legal in light of Livingston Shirt), but also makes
coercive speeches against the union? Five years after Livingston Shirt, the
Supreme Court, in the Nutone case,8 held that an employer might enforce
5 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 409, 33 L.R.R.M. 1156, 1159 (1953). By its holding, the Board
overruled the doctrine of Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 28 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1951),
enforcement denied, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953), that
an employer who made a privileged speech was guilty of an unfair labor practice if he
denied a request by the union to reply on the employer's time and property.
0 However, enforcement of a no-solicitation rule against employee activity outside
of working hours, although on company property, would be an unfair labor practice.
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), which upheld the Board's
decisions in Republic Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 12 L.R.R.M. 320 (1943), and
Le Tourneau Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 13 L.R.R.M. 227 (1944). NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), distinguished a similar no -distribution rule against
non-employees. It held that an employer may protect his
property against nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable
efforts by the union through other available channels of communication will
enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the employer's notice
or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution.
Id. at 112.
7 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110 (1962). NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324
F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 951 (1964), upheld the Board rule pre-
venting an employer from prohibiting his employees from distributing union literature
on company property during non-working hours.
8 NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
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his valid no-solicitation rule against his employees, and at the same time
engage in coercive anti-union solicitation without giving the union equal
time. The critical issue, as the majority saw it, was whether, under the
circumstances, "the employer's conduct to any considerable degree created
an imbalance in the opportunities for organizational communication."°
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a majority of six Justices, refused
to take the mechanical approach advanced by Mr. Chief Justice Warren's
dissent, that a valid no-solicitation rule coupled with the employer's coercive
anti-union solicitation should by itself entitle the union to equal time. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's rejection of a per se approach extended even to the
case where other unfair labor practices accompanied the employer's coercive
solicitation. In fact,
No such mechanical answers will avail for the solution of this non-
mechanical, complex problem in labor-management relations. If, by
virtue of the location of the plant and of the facilities and resources
available to the union, the opportunities for effectively reaching the
employees with a pro-union message, in spite of a no-solicitation
rule, are at least as great as the employer's ability to promote the
legally authorized expression of his anti-union views, there is no
basis for invalidating these "otherwise valid" rules."'"
But the decision in Nutone is not so conclusive as might first appear.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that the record did not indicate that
the employees, or the union on their behalf, requested the employer to make
an exception to the no-solicitation rule in order to allow pro-union solicitation.
Furthermore, no attempt was made to show that the no-solicitation rules truly
diminished the ability of the union to carry its message to the employees 11
In Montgomery Ward12 the union did request the employer to allow an
exception to his no-solicitation rule in order to reply to his coercive speeches.
And both the Board's and the Sixth Circuit agreed that the employer should
have honored the request. Most important was the employer's extension of
its privileged broad no
-solicitation rule to prohibit all union solicitation by
employees on company property. This was illegal, and, coupled with the
' Id. at 362.
10
 Id. at 364. On the other hand Mr. Chief Justice Warren argued that:
the validity of both practices—the enforcement of the no-solicitation rule and
the coercive antiunion solicitation—comes into question, for they are not
separable. . . . Employees during working hours are the classic captive audi-
ence. . . . It is not necessary to suggest that in all circumstances a union must
have the same facilities and opportunity to solicit employees as the employer has
in opposing the union. However, the plant premises and working time are such
decisive factors during a labor dispute that when an employer denies them to
the union and at the same time pursues his own program of coercion on the
premises and during working hours, this denial is by itself an interference with
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and hence contrary to Section
8(a)(1),
Id. at 368-69.
11 Id. at 362.
12
 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, supra note 1.
13 Montgomery Ward & CO., supra note 2.
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employer's coercive anti-union speeches, it "created a glaring imbalance in
organizational communication." 14
The Board had found this "glaring imbalance" in May Department
Stores, an earlier case, 15
 but the same Sixth Circuit (different judges pre-
siding) had held that it did not exist." The factors that distinguish May
Department Stores from Montgomery Ward appear to be the absence of
coercion in the employer's speeches and the validity of the broad no-
solicitation rule.
Whether the employer must give the union equal time, when either of
the above factors are missing, has not yet been decided." Also not decided
is whether the equal time rule applies outside of the retail store context where
the special needs of the employers justify a broad no-solicitation rule."
Answers to these questions will be slow in coming in light of the case-by-case
approach favored by the courts." In the meantime, it is worth remembering
that the objective of the Board's campaign rules is to afford the employer
and union equality of opportunity for organizational communication to the
employees, and that, generally, the legality of employer conduct with respect
to enforcement of no-solicitation rules depends on whether or not this con-
duct tends to deprive the union of its opportunity to present its case.
B. NO-SOLICITATION AND NO-DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN
EMPLOYER AND UNION
Although the employer's unilateral no-solicitation, no-distribution limita-
tion on employee activity during non-working time and in non-working areas
is presumptively invalid,' the employer has been allowed to accomplish the
same result by persuading the union to include the limitation in a collective
bargaining contract.
14 Id, at 849, 55 L,R.R.M. at 1064.
15
 May Department Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797, 49 L.R.R.M. 1862 (1962).
19 May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963).
17 For example: when the employer does not use coercion in his anti-union speeches,
but does have an invalid broad no-solicitation rule; or when he uses coercive speeches,
but his broad no-solicitation rule is valid.
18 It should be noted that the Regional Attorney of the 9th Region, located in
Cincinnati, Ohio, has issued a complaint against an industrial employer for his failure to
allow the union equal time, even though he had no privileged broad no-solicitation rule.
This charge, against Wald Mfg. Co., was heard on May 25, 1965.
19 One writer has suggested that a happy medium between the automatic rules of
the Board (often crude and arbitrary) and the case-by-case approach of the courts
(that gives no clear guidance) would be to allow the union equal time whenever the
employer speaks to employees during the last week before an election, and the unit
involved is sizable, i.e., more than 50 to 75 employees. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign
Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv.
L. Rev. 38, 102 (1964).
1 Republic Aviation Corp, v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), wherein Peyton Packing
Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 12 L.R.R.M. 183, modified, 50 N.L.R.B, 355 (1943), was cited with
approval, and the Board's decision in Republic Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 12
L.R.R.M. 320 (1943) was upheld. The rule was further refined by the Board in Stoddard-
Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110 (1962), and upheld in NLRB v.
United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 951 (1964).
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The Seventh Circuit reached this result in NLRB v. Gale Products.2
reversing the Board, the court referred to dicta in May Department Stores
Co., where the Board said that contracts containing no-solicitation provisions
"are the results of the mutual accommodation involved in Collective Bargain-
ing . .. [and] the employees embraced by these contracts .. . have thereby
effectively bargained away their right to engage in union solicitation on the
respondent's premises."3
In adopting the May rationale, the court overlooked a possible change
in the Board's position fifteen years later in Wah Chang Corp.4 There, a panel
of Members Rodgers, Jenkins, and Fanning, to whom the Board had dele-
gated its powers, affirmed the Trial Examiner's report without discussion.
The Trial Examiner had recommended that the Board find the employer
guilty of violating sections 8(a) (1) and (2) for maintaining and giving
effect to a contractual provision requiring the employees to receive permis-
sion from the incumbent union before engaging in solicitation on the em-
ployer's premises.
The Seventh Circuit also rejected the Board's position in the principal
case. Here, for the first time, the Board had discussed in detail the rationale
of its stand. It conceded that a contractual provision barring solicitation and
distribution differed from a rule imposed unilaterally by the employer, and
that the union might have won certain concessions as a result of its agreement
to include the provision. But, in refusing to sanction enforcement of such a
provision against rivals of the contracting union, the Board insisted that the
"validity of a contractual waiver of employee rights must depend . . . upon
whether the interference with the employees' statutory rights is so great as
to override any legitimate reasons for upholding the waiver." 5
Under the circumstances in Gale, the Board held that the clause violated
section 8(a) (1). It found that the contract clause went far in perpetuating
the incumbent union by denying dissident employees an opportunity to
express their opinions, and that it unduly infringed on "their basic rights
under the Act."
The two dissenting members of the Board, Chairman McCullough and
Member Leedom, argued that the union's controverted exercise of its statu-
tory right to bargain away employee rights was no more serious than "sur-
rendering the right to strike, which the Board and the courts have recognized
may lawfully he done."7
The Seventh Circuit adopted the Board dissent, and added a policy
consideration. The court pointed out that the contractual provision waiving
the employees' right to solicit union membership was "conducive to the sta-
bilization of labor relations during the contract period and thus in harmony
with a prime objective of the Act." 8
 On the other hand, the dissenting judge
2 337 F.2d 390 (1964).
3
 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 981 n.17, 15 L.R.R.M. 173, 174 (1944).
4
 124 N.L.R.B. 1170, 44 L.R.R.M. 1615 (1959).
5
 Gale Prods., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1249, 53 L.R.R.M. 1242, 1243 (1963).
6 Ibid.	 '
7 Id. at 1251, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1244.
N.L.R.B. v. Gale Prods., supra note 2, at 392.
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argued that the purposes of the act would be frustrated by contractual provi-
sions that tend to smother competitive union organizational activity. He also
noted that the right of freedom to organize belongs to dissidents as well as
to the bargaining agent.
This latter point was the genesis of controversy in General Motors Corp., 9
which the Board handed down before the reversal of Gale. The Board, citing
Gale, held that the employer and union violated section 8(a) (1) and
8 (b) (1) (A), respectively, by maintaining a contract provision prohibiting
employee distribution of union literature during non-working time and in
non-work areas—insofar as it extended to employees who were members of
labor organizations other than the respondent union. But the contracting
union and its members were held bound by the agreement.
Member Jenkins, however, would not limit the allowance of employee
distribution and solicitation to members of dissident unions. Rather, "such
a contractual prohibition of organizational activity is also invalid to employees
who are members or supporters of the contractory union.'"° He could see
no logic in holding the contractual waiver effective with respect to organiza-
tional activity on behalf of the incumbent, while holding it ineffective as to
activity on behalf of the rival. He concluded that "apart from the anomalous
situation this holding in Gale creates, I think that holding, and the
positions of the majority here, fail to give those 'basic rights' the recognition
the Act commands."' Although Member Jenkins' stand appears more reason-
able, the issue may be moot in light of the Seventh Circuit's reversal of Gate."
While the Seventh Circuit in Gale is right in pointing out that one of the
policies of the act is to stabilize industrial relations, the Board's rationale is
preferable. A union should not be permitted to entrench itself by a contrac-
tual arrangement to which it is a party. It is irrelevant that such a clause may
rarely in practice prevent a dissatisfied unit from casting aside a representa-
tive it no longer desires, or that the clause was entered into in good faith. It
is enough that the effect of the clause might be to saddle a unit with a repre-
sentative which no longer commands its confidence.
In addition, a union's waiver of the right to strike is not the same as a
waiver of the employee's right to engage in on-the-premises organizational ac-
tivity during non-working hours. If enough employees are dissatisfied with the
union's waiver of their right to strike, they can immediately oust that union.
But if the union bargains away the employees' rights to engage in on-the-prem-
ises organizational activity, and the employees subsequently do not like it, or
9 147 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 56 L.R.R.M. 1241 (1964).
11) Id., 56 L.R.R.M. at 1242.
11 Ibid.
12 There may he a conflict between circuit courts. Prior to the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Gale, the Ninth Circuit collaterally handled the same issues in Wah Chang
Corp. v. NLRB, 305 F.2d 15 (1962). The Board was denied enforcement of its order of
reinstatement of the employees who had violated the employer-union contract rule. But
the court found the rule valid, i.e., one that the Board allows an employer to make
unilaterally. If the rule could not be made unilaterally by the employer, the court said
that the contract provision to the same effect could not be held to limit either dissident
employees or union employees.
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do not like the union itself, the very clause which the employees dislike will
hinder them in ridding themselves of it.
On the further question of whether the contractual waiver should be in-
effective as to dissidents, but not to members of the incumbent union, Mem-
ber Jenkin's position in General Motors seems more logical. If the employees'
right to organize on the premises is so basic a right under the act as to allow
a minority of employees who are members of dissident unions to ignore the
contractual prohibition, then all the employees should be free to do so. The
incumbent union, which was elected by a majority of the employees, might
still best represent the workers. Its members should not be prevented from
effectively fighting to retain it. If they are prevented, dissident groups are en-
couraged to breach the industrial peace which the Seventh Circuit in Gale rec-
ognized as so important.
C. ELECTION OF REMEDIES BY UNION
In Bernel Foam Prods. Co.,1 the Board, declaring that the representation
process is not a game and that the Board is not a detached observer, expressly
overruled Aiello Dairy Farms, 2
 which had stood for almost a decade.
The facts of Bernel, essentially the same as those in Aiello, are as follows:
the union obtained authorization cards from a majority of the employees in
the bargaining unit; the union requested the employer to recognize it as the
exclusive bargaining representative; the employer refused; the union filed a
representation petition with the Board; the employer committed unfair labor
practices prior to the election; the union lost the election, filed objections,
which resulted in the election being set aside, and filed an unfair labor
practice charge, alleging that the employer had violated section 8(a) (5)
of the act3
 by his refusal to bargain when the union declared that it repre-
sented a majority of the employees.
Under the above facts, the Aiello rule required the union to choose be-
tween invoking the slow and costly process of filing an 8(a) (5) unfair labor
practice charge, which would postpone the election, or continuing to partici-
pate in the election to establish its representative status. If the union chose
the latter, thereby risking the loss of its majority status by the later unlawful
conduct of the employer, it could lose the election. If it did, it was deemed to
have waived its right to file the refusal to bargain charge. At most, the union
could request that the election be set aside and a new one ordered in light of
the employer's misconduct.
The three member majority of Bernel recognized that a new "election
is not a remedy either in statutory concept or in reality. On the contrary, ex-
perience has demonstrated that a vast majority of the re-run elections' results
favor the party which interfered with the original election." 4
 Therefore, since
1 146 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 56 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1964).
110 N.L.R.B. 1365, 35 L.R.R.M. 1235 (1954). Aiello had overturned the Board's
original rule, stated in M. H. Davidson Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 142, 28 L.R.R.M. 1026 (1951)
(Member Murdock dissenting).
3 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
	 I58(a) (5) (1958).
4
 Berne] Foam Prods. Co., supra note 1, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1041. The majority did not
cite any authority for this statement, and dissenting Member Leedom did "not share this
far-reaching conclusion." Id., 56 L.R.R.M, at 1044 n.17.
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the new election is not a remedy, the union has not had a meaningful choice
of procedures, and it should not be deemed to have irrevocably committed
itself to the representation proceeding.
By thus abolishing the Aiello waiver rule, the Bernel decision gives the
union two choices of the procedure that it may follow. It may either file an
(8) (a) (5) refusal to bargain charge before the election, thereby postponing
it, or it may proceed with the election and file the charge thereafter, if it loses.
These alternative procedures for establishing that the union represents a ma-
jority of the employees were denied in Aiello because they were deemed inher-
ently inconsistent.n But the majority in Bernel argued that
the unfair labor practice and the representation proceedings are not
inconsistent. The latter may establish the union's majority as of the
day of the election, but it does not resolve the union's majority
status on the date demand for recognition and bargaining was made
and refused—which is the determination made in the former pro-
ceeding.°
The majority pointed out that it is the refusal to bargain which causes
the union to revert to the election procedure. When the union files the repre-
sentation petition, it does not change its position that it represents a majority
of the employees, even though it must as a formal matter allege that a ques-
tion concerning representation exists. "Rather it is stating the employer's as-
sertion of such a question and seeking an election as a means of proving that
there is no validity in that assertion."
The other ground on which the Board in Aiello had based its election of
remedies rule was that.allowing the union to file a refusal to bargain charge
after losing the election involved the expenditure of public funds in "useless
and repetitive proceedings." The majority in Bernel, however, reasoned that
there might now be a saving of time and money by encouraging the union to
postpone its refusal to bargain charge and to proceed to the less costly elec-
tion, which it might win, thereby obviating the need for refusal to bargain
proceedings.9
The majority felt that, in any event, considerations of economy must not
take precedence over the policies of the act. An employer should not be al-
lowed to evade responsibility for violating the act. And, since Congress' over-
riding concern in this part of the act was the right of employees to be repre-
See Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. Rev. 209 (1963), where an
almost three-year study, commencing in 1960, shows that, of 212 re-run elections caused
by employer misconduct, the objecting union won 30%, picking up an average of a
little over 20% of the total votes cast.
5 Aiello Dairy Farms, supra note 2, at 1368, 35 L.R.R.M. at 1236.
6 Bernel Foam Prods. Co., supra note 1, 56 L.R.R,M. at 1040.
7
 id., 56 L.R.R.M. at 1040-41. The union must show that at least 30% of the
employees in the unit want it to be their collective bargaining representative. 29 C.F.R.
§ 101.18(a)(4) (1964).
8
 Aiello Dairy Farms, supra note 2, at 1368, 35 L.R.R.M. at 1236.
9 Berne! Foam Prods. Co., supra note 1, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1041.
845
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
sented by a labor organization of their own choosing, the Board's task is to
provide an adequate remedy instead of acting like a spectator in a game of
"election of remedies." 1°
In finding a refusal to bargain, the Board agreed with the Trial Exam-
iner" that the employer's conduct constituted a violation of section 8(a) (5)
under the Board's decision in Snow & Sons.' 2 In that case, the employer
wrongfully refused to bargain when he sought a Board-directed election with-
out a valid ground and without a reasonable doubt about either the appropri-
ateness of the proposed unit or the union's representative status, but he did
not embark upon a program of interference to dissipate the union's majority.
Disagreeing with the Trial Examiner, however, the Board accepted the
General Counsel's contention that there was a violation of section 8(a) (5)
under the Board's decision in Joy Silk Mills. 13 In Joy Silk, the employer
wrongfully refused to bargain by insisting on a Board election as proof of the
union's majority, even though he had no good faith doubt about the union's
status, but was motivated by a rejection of the collective bargaining principle
or by a desire to gain time in order to undermine the union's majority status.
The Board in Joy Silk declared that
the question of whether an employer is acting in good or bad faith
at the time of the refusal . . . must be determined in the light of
all relevant facts in the case, including any unlawful conduct of the
employer, the sequence of events, and the time lapse between the
refusal and the unlawful conduct. 14
Reversing the Trial Examiner, the Board found that the employer in
Bernel had violated section 8(a)(1) by promising benefits to the employees,
and by suggesting that they form a shop committee.' 5 After considering all
the facts, including the employer's illegal conduct, the Board held the em-
ployer's refusal to bargain wrongful because it was motivated by a desire to
create an opportunity to dissipate the union's majority."'
10 Id., 56 L.R.R.M. at 104142.
11 Id., 56 L.R.R.M, at 1042.
12
 134 N.L.R.B. 709, 49 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1962).
13 Bernet Foam Prods. Co., supra note 1, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1042. The Trial Examiner
did not use Joy Silk in finding a wrongful refusal to bargain, because he held that there
was no intervening unlawful conduct by the employer.
14 Joy Silk Mills, 85 N,L.R.B. 1263, 1264, 24 L.R.R.M. 1548, 1550 (1949).
16 Bernel Foam Prods. Co., supra note 1, L.R.R.M. at 1043.
se Id., 56 L.R.R.M. at 1042. Member Jenkins concurred in this conclusion, see
infra note 17.
It should be noted that "the sequence of events, and the time lapse between the
refusal and the unlawful conduct" (Joy Silk, supra note 18) have been rendered less im-
portant as "relevant facts" by Bernel. In fact, it now appears that any unlawful conduct
by the employer subsequent to his refusal to bargain is sufficient, by itself, to support a
finding of bad faith in his refusal. This conclusion is reached by observing that the
majority in Bernel argued that unlawful conduct occurring two weeks after the refusal
to bargain, did not happen too late to indicate bad faith motivation in the refusal. The
majority added that other unlawful conduct, occurring the day before the election, also
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Dissenting Member Leedom argued that the Aiello rule should not be
overturned. He reiterated the arguments made by the Board in Aiello, and
concluded "that it would be balancing the scales unfairly toward the union
side to allow it to have 'two bites at the apple.' "17
Member Leedom also pinpointed an apparent inconsistency in the
majority's decision. As an illustration, he supposed that, as in Aiello and
Bernel, the refusal to bargain occurs before the filing of the petition for
election (the cutoff date for unlawful pre-election conduct), but that, unlike
Aiello and Bernel, the employer engages in no other unlawful conduct be-
fore the election. 18
 As he saw it, "since the majority's 'reversal' of Aiello
was predicated on the fact that the election was set aside and was therefore
a 'nullity,' presumably it would continue to apply the Aiello rule where the
election is not set aside because no objections were filed or the Regional
Director dismissed the objections."" Nevertheless, some of the reasons given
by the majority for abolishing the Aiello waiver rule suggest that it should
not be applied, even though the election is not set aside. "Thus, the majority
says that Aiello is wrong because there is no inconsistency between representa-
tion and unfair labor practice proceedings and therefore the election of
remedies doctrine is inapplicable; and, further, that as a matter of public
policy, the Board should not permit an employer to evade responsibility for
violating the Act."2° Unable to find a reason why it would make any dif-
ference under these theories, insofar as Aiello is concerned, whether or not
the election were set aside, Member Leedom confessed that he could not
reconcile the inconsistencies in the majority's opinion.
The Board soon disclosed what it intended to do in the case Member
indicated bad faith in the refusal, because it happened at a time when the employer
would benefit most from his unlawful acts.
The timing of the unlawful conduct in Bernet should be compared with the timing
in Joy Silk, where the wrongful conduct started exactly half-way through the election
period and continued until the end.
The allowable time span, within which unlawful conduct can indicate bad faith in
the employer's refusal to bargain, is made total by the fact that employer unfair labor
practices in the period immediately after a refusal to bargain are even more consistent
with bad faith. Therefore, it is hard to conceive of any point in the total pre-election time
span when wrongful conduct by the employer will not indicate to the Board a bad faith
refusal to bargain.
17
 Id., 56 L.R.R.M. at 1045. Member Jenkins, on the other hand, found it unneces-
sary to pass upon the merits ofthe Aiello waiver rule. He agreed with the majority that,
since Joy Silk Mills, 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 24 L.R.R.M. 1548 (1949), modified, 185 P.2d
732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951), allows the question of good or bad
faith in the refusal to bargain to be determined in light of all the relevant facts, it
was clear that the employer was motivated by bad faith in his refusal to bargain. But he
did not believe that the Aiello waiver rule should apply to the union in Bernet, since a
requirement for application is the union's pre-election knowledge of the employer's un-
lawful conduct. Member Jenkins did not think that, under the facts of the case, the
union was sufficiently aware of the employer's unlawful conduct when it proceeded with
the election. Id., 56 L.R.R.M. at 1043.
18 Id., 56 L.R.R.M. at 1044 n.20.
19 Id., 56 L.R.R.M. at 1044.
2° Id., 56 L.R.R.M. at 1044 n.20.
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Leedom supposes, but failed to explain any "apparent inconsistencies" in
the Bernel opinion. In Irving Air Chute Co., 21 involving facts similar to those
of Bernel, the Board went out of its way to declare:
This case falls within our decision in Bernel. . • We held
in that case that a labor organization which loses an election may
nevertheless seek bargaining relief under Section 8(a) (5) of the
Act or Section 8(a) (1) in appropriate circumstances, where it ap-
pears that the employer has engaged in conduct requiring the elec-
tion to be set aside. We will not grant such relief, however, unless
the election be set aside upon meritorious objections filed in the
representation case. Were the election not set aside on the basis
of objections in the present representation case, we would not now
direct a bargaining order even though the unfair labor practice
phase of this proceeding itself established the employer's interfer-
ence with the election.22 (Emphasis supplied.)
Irving Air Chute teaches that the union should file its petition for an
election contemporaneously with its demand for recognition, or sooner.
But cases will doubtless arise where this is not done. When they do, the
Board will be forced to answer the charge that the rule in Irving Air Chute
is inconsistent with much of the reasoning in Bernel.
For example, suppose that a union represents a majority of the em-
ployees in the appropriate unit, and demands recognition; the employer
refuses; he commits section 8(a) (1) and (2) violations that destroy the
union's majority, but cease before a petition is filed; although it knows of
these violations, the union files a petition for an election; the employer
engages in no unlawful conduct whatever between the filing and the elec-
tion; the union loses. And suppose the same case, except that the union
does not know of the employer's unlawful conduct when it files its petition.
Finally, take the case, mentioned above, supposed by Member Leedom in
his dissent in Bernel.
Since no unlawful conduct occurred between the filing of the petition
and the election in these three examples, the election would not be set
aside; 23 taken literally, then, the Board's statement in Irving Air Chute
would preclude any bargaining relief in an unfair labor practice proceeding.
Many of the reasons for overruling Aiello put forth in Bernel, however,
seem to apply in the first example. 24 Moreover, if the refusal to allow an
8(a) (5) charge unless the election is set aside rests on an application of
the Aiello rule at the time of the petition, the second example requires a
different result from the first. For under Aiello lack of knowledge of the
employer's unlawful conduct precluded any waiver.
Perhaps, Member Leedom's hypothetical is the most illuminating of
all. As pointed out, the same inconsistency between Bernel's reasoning in
21
 149 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 57 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1964).
22 id., 57 L.R.R.M. at 1332.
23 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 453, 51 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1962).
24 See text accompanying note 20, supra.
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overruling Aiello and Irving Air Chute's requirement that the election be
set aside appears here. But it just is not the same case as the other two
because the employer did not interfere with the union's claimed majority.
Since the employees rejected the union of their own free choice in a secret
ballot election, why saddle them with it in an unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding. In theory, the employees' right to choose freely whether or not
they want a union is the cornerstone of the act. Presumably, if the election
is valid, they have made their choice.
Under the Board's rules governing representation proceedings, how-
ever, if the election in the first two examples is also valid. If the Board
treats these cases differently, it will undermine its representation proceeding.
Yet, in Bernet, the Board felt that the lingering effect of employer inter-
ference was illustrated by its experience wth Aiello, which demonstrated that
a vast majority of re-run elections were lost by the union. 25
 It is hard to
believe that the conduct of the employer in these examples would not have
the same result. Nevertheless, a line must be drawn beyond which conduct
will not be considered to interfere with an election. Administrative necessity
may well support drawing it at the filing of the petition. Besides, the union
can protect itself by filing the petition at the same time that it demands
recognition from the employer.
These are some of the questions Bernet raises2a—the answers will have
to wait for the cases.
D. APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT
In the recent case of NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co) the Su-
preme Court confirmed the proposition that "extent of organization" may be
a factor in determining the appropriate bargaining unit. 2
Insurance Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, had requested the
Board to certify it as bargaining representative for all twenty-three debit
agents at the Woonsocket, Rhode Island, district office of Metropolitan, a
nation-wide insurance company with over 1,000 district offices. Woonsocket
was one of eight district offices maintained in Rhode Island by Metropolitan,
all of which are within greater Providence. The nearest district office to Woon-
socket is in Pawtucket, twelve miles away. The Board certified the union.
Metropolitan refused to bargain, contending that in determining the appro-
priate bargaining unit, the Board treated as controlling the extent of union
25
 Bernet Foam Prods. Co., supra note 1, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1041.
26 As a byproduct of Bernet, the legality of authorization cards will doubtless be
litigated more frequently.
1
 — U.S. —, 33 U.S.L. Week 4302 (U.S. April .5, 1965). Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision, this case was discussed extensively in 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 349
(1965).
2
 A leading case for this proposition, which gives a literal interpretation to section
9(c) (5) of the act (discussed below), is Texas Pipe Line Co. v. NLRB, 296 F.2d 208
(5th Cir. 1961). In agreement is National Labor Relations Board, Twenty-Eighth Annual
Report 51 (1964), stating: "Although extent of organization may he a factor evaluated,
under section 9(c) (5) it cannot be given controlling weight."
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organization, in violation of Section 9(c) (5) of the LMRA. Metropolitan
claimed that the only appropriate units would be (1) all its offices in the
United States, (2) all its offices in its New England Territory, or (3) all its
offices in Rhode Island. In an unfair labor practice proceeding, the Board
adopted the prior determination of the appropriate bargaining unit, held that
the petitioner violated section 8(a) (5), and ordered it to bargain with the
union. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied enforcement, hold-
ing that in determining the appropriate unit, the Board accorded controlling
weight to extent of organization. No other basis appeared for the Board's
decisions The Supreme Court agreed that the Board had failed to articu-
late the grounds for its decision. At the same time, the Court gave the Board
the benefit of the doubt by holding that, on its face, the Board's determination
of the appropriate unit could not be found to have illegally made "extent of
organization" the controlling factor. The Court remanded the case to the
Board in order to allow it to explain the factors involved in its determination.
Section 9(b) of the act gives the Board broad authority to
decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the full-
est freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof. . . . 4
But the 1947 enactment of section 9(c) (5) placed an express limitation on
the Board's discretion by providing:
In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes speci-
fied in subsection (b) the extent to which the employees have orga-
nized shall not be controlling' (Emphasis supplied.)
The issue of the weight that the Board may give to "extent of organiza-
tion" arose in NLRB v. Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 6 where the Fourth Circuit
upheld the Board's decision to depart from its 1944 rule that denied certifica-
tion to any unit for insurance agents that was less than state-wide.? The court
found that extent of organization may be considered by the Board as a fac-
tor.8
 Unanswered was the question whether the pre-1944 Board rule of some-
times allowing extent of organization to govern° was resurrected.
If the Board in Metropolitan and later cases was attempting to bring
back the pre-1944 rule, and trying to hide the fact by not specifying the fac-
tors that it considered relevant, it was clearly violating its statutory duty.
This was the belief of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the instant
8
 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 906, 911 (1st Cir. 1964),
4 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1958).
5 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (5) (1958).
6 319 F.2d 690 (1963).
I Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1635, 14 L.R.R.M. 187 (1944).
8
 The Board decision in Quaker City is reported in 134 N.L.R.B. 96, 49 L.R.R.M.
1281 (1961). The Board found these other factors; (1) ,
 autonomous operation of the
district office; (2) overall supervision by the district manager ; (3) lack of contact among
employees of the various district offices; and (4) absence of any administrative sub-
division between the home office and the district office.
9 Prudential Ins. Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 450, 12 L.R.R.M. 239 (1943).
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case. It refused to enforce the Board's order to bargain with the disputed unit
because of its conclusion "that the ... Board ... has indeed .. [regarded]
the extent of the union organization as controlling in violation of 9(c) (5) of
the Act.'"°
The court based its conclusion on the Board's failure to articulate rea-
sons for its determination of the bargaining unit; the Board's apparently in-
consistent determinations of appropriate units of Metropolitan's employees
in other regions; its failure to discuss in these cases what weight it gave to
the factor of the extent of union organization; and the fact that in these cases
the Board consistently certified the unit requested by the union.
The Supreme Court, in overruling the First Circuit, agreed that "other
recent decisions of the Board are relevant [but] we cannot . . . agree that
the only possible conclusion here is that the Board has violated § 9(c) (5).""
In remanding the case to the Board, the Court declared that the Board "must
`disclose the basis of its order' and 'give clear indication that it has exercised
the discretion with which Congress has empowered it. )>12
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. DUTY TO BARGAIN
1. Employer's Decision to Subcontract
In December, the Supreme Court announced its long awaited decision in
Fibreboard v. NLRB. 1 It held that the "contracting out of . . . work previ-
ously performed by employees of the bargaining unit, which the employees
were capable of continuing to perform . . . is covered by the phrase 'terms and
conditions of employment' within the meaning of section 8(d)."2 Hence, the
employer violated section 8(a) (5) 3 by unilaterally subcontracting work and
failing to bargain with the union. The Court was careful to point out that its
decision rested on the particular facts and that not all subcontracting is a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Nevertheless, three Justices felt constrained
to write a concurring opinion stating that, although the peculiar facts of this
case created a mandatory duty to bargain, they were opposed to any holding
10 Supra note 3, at 911.
11 NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note I, 33 U.S.L. Week at 4303.
12 Ibid. Mr. Justice Douglas, the sole dissenter, declared that all the parties wanted
a decision on the merits, and that the Board order should be set aside. Ibid.
In light of its decision in the instant Metropolitan case, the Supreme Court has
recently granted writs of certiorari in the other Metropolitan cases, involving the same
issue. It vacated the judgments of the courts of appeals and remanded the cases with
instructions to remand to the NLRB for further proceedings consistent with its opinion
in Metropolitan. 33 U.S.L. Week 3349 (U.S. April 26, 1965).
1 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
2 Id. at 210.
a Section 8(a) (5) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—(5) to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees. . .
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958).
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which would make subcontracting in general a "term or condition of employ-
ment" within the scope of mandatory bargaining. 4
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the NLRB's holding
that a decision to subcontract made solely for economic reasons may subject
the employer to a requirement to bargain.° The Board on its first considera-
tion of Fibreboard had dismissed the complaint for failure to show that the
employer's decision was motivated by a desire to avoid a legal obligation
under the NLRA.° Thus, the view of the Board and the courts was that a de-
cision to subcontract was within management's prerogative, so long as it was
not made for the purpose of avoiding collective bargaining, union organiza-
tion, or some other right protected by the NLRA. 7
The Board reversed its position in Town & Country Mfg. Co.,g and an-
nounced its policy of ordering bargaining, whether or not the subcontracting
was motivated by anti-union sentiments.° Subsequently, the Board reheard
Fibreboard and reversed on the authority of Town & Country." The Board
also found an 8(a) (5) violation in Adams Dairy, Inc.," but the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed because it could find no anti-union motivation.r2 Following its
Fibreboard decision, the Supreme Court remanded Adams Dairy "for recon-
sideration in light of" Fibreboard."
The Fibreboard decision raises a great many questions and creates some
confusion because it is not clear whether the Court means its decision to be
an exception to a general rule that subcontracting falls within management's
prerogative, or whether it regards subcontracting as a subject of mandatory
bargaining except in particular, undefined circumstances. The concurring
opinion feels that the Court adopted the latter approach, and although the
majority said its decision was limited to the facts, its opinion speaks of broad
policy reasons for including subcontracting as a subject of mandatory bar-
gaining.
4 Fibreboard v. NLRB, supra note 1, at 217. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the con-
curring opinion and based his holding on the following facts: The work contracted out
had been performed by employees in the bargaining unit; the work continued to be
performed in the employer's plant after it was subcontracted and remained under the
ultimate supervision of the employer; the independent contractor was paid on a "cost
plus" basis, so that the employer remained liable for the actual costs incurred. He
concluded: "all that is involved is the substitution of one group of workers for another
to perform the same task in the same plant under the ultimate control of the same
employer." Id. at 224.
5
 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 51 L.R.R.M. 1101 (1962).
0
 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, 47 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1961).
7 See NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1962) ; NLRB v. Adkins
Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955) ; NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 211
F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954). Compare NLRB v. Gluck Brewing Co., 144 F.2d 847 (8th Cir.
1944).
8
 136 N.L.R.13. 1022, 49 L.R.R.M. 1918 (1962).
9
 The decision was momentarily robbed of some of its vitality when the Fifth Circuit
specifically based its enforcement of the Board order on a finding of anti-union motiva-
tion. Town & Country Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 846 (1963).
10 See note 5 supra. The Board's order was affirmed in 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
11 137 N.L.R.B. 815, 50 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1962).
12 322 F.2d 553 (1963).
18 379 U.S. 644 (1965).
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Assuming no absolute duty to bargain, when does the duty arise? Or
perhaps, more properly, when is the employer excused from the duty? Does
the employer have a different duty at the bargaining table than he has when
the actual occasion for unilateral subcontracting arises? And what is the effect
of a subcontracting clause in the collective bargaining contract? What if the
parties negotiate on the subject but do not incorporate a subcontracting clause
into the contract? It is also proper to inquire how previous conduct and sub-
contracting practices will affect the employer's duty, and whether the union
may waive its right to protest to unilateral subcontracting by its failure to
request that the employer bargain. Lastly, when the employer has a duty to
bargain, may a unilateral subcontracting decision be made prior to informing
the union, and if so, what if it is irrevocable?
Fibreboard has not provided answers to these questions, but the Board,
in a series of cases following Town & Country, has provided some indications
that unilateral subcontracting will raise a duty to bargain except in the pres-
ence of certain justifying circumstances. The remainder of this section will
deal with these cases and whatever answers they provide.
In Motorsearch Co. 14 the union knew of the employer's subcontracting
when it sat down to negotiate a collective bargaining contract. In the course
of eighteen bargaining sessions the union did not protest the subcontracting.
When the union subsequently brought an unfair labor practice charge, the
Board dismissed it because the union, by its failure to bargain when it had
the opportunity, was estopped from later complaining to the Board. This evi-
dences the Board's desire to have parties negotiate their differences, when
practicable, without Board intervention. Furthermore, for this approach to
work, the Board must hold that when the union raises the problem of subcon-
tracting in negotiations, the employer must bargain. The recent Westinghouse
Electric case'' went even further by implying that if the union in general ne-
gotiations protested existing and long established subcontracting practices,
the employer would be obligated to bargain. Westinghouse also indicated that
"an employer is under a continuing duty to bargain on request with respect
to subcontracting affecting unit work and, therefore, must bargain with
the union in good faith upon demand as to such subcontracting even during
the term of an existing agreement."'
The Shell Oil cases" afford an opportunity to examine the employer's
duty to bargain about unilateral subcontracting at several different stages in
the general negotiatory process. The only reference in the collective bargain-
ing contract to subcontracting was a clause requiring the employer to pay
union wages when it contracted out work which could be done by the unit.
The employer had adhered to this clause for many years, and had, during that
time, established a practice of subcontracting unit work without notice to the
union. When the time came to negotiate a new contract, the union expressed
its desire to bargain about subcontracting practices and to limit the employer's
14 138 N.L.R.B. 1490, 51 L.R.R.M. 1240 (1962).
1 5 150 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 58 L.R.R.M. 1257 (1965).
111 The quote is from a very recent case, American Oil Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 58
L.R.R.M. 1412, 1413 (1965).
17
 149 N.L.R.B. Nos. 22, 23, 57 L.R.R.M. 1271, 1275 (1964).
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power to unilaterally subcontract. The employer was willing to bargain and
agreed to pay union wages when he did subcontract, but through forty-seven
bargaining sessions, he adamantly refused to limit his right to subcontract in
any other way. The collective bargaining contract expired, but the parties
continued to operate substantially under its terms. After several months the
union declared a strike; subsequently it signed a new contract in which the
employer agreed only to pay union wages as he had in the past when subcon-
tracting. At this point, the union brought 8(a) (5) charges, alleging that the
employer had refused to bargain about the following subcontracts:
1. Subcontracts awarded after the bargaining contract had expired, but
before the strike.
2. Subcontracts temporarily awarded to replace striking workers.
3. Subcontracts awarded during the strike which were not completed
until after the new contract became effective.
4. Subcontracts awarded after the new bargaining contract went into
effect.
The Board, in denying relief on all counts, emphasized that for years the
employer had been subcontracting work and that this was his customary busi-
ness practice. The contractual provision requiring payment of union wages
was not a limitation on this right and even tended to imply the existence of
the right. Because it was a customary business practice and would not result
in a change in the employees' conditions of employment, the employer could
continue to subcontract after expiration of the bargaining contract, so long as
this subcontracting did not vary in kind or degree from what had been his
previous practice. Thus, subcontracting after expiration of the contract was
valid despite the strike and even though some of the subcontracts did not
expire until after the new collective bargaining contract became effective. As
to subcontracts made after the new collective bargaining contract was signed,
they were merely a continuation of the customary subcontracting practice.
The new contract did not limit the practice, and the mere discussion of sub-
contracting at the bargaining table was not enough to change a customary
business practice.'s
The Board also upheld the employer's temporary subcontracts for the
duration of the strike, even though these were apparently substantial enough
in number to warrant a finding that they differed in degree and kind. The
Board said that "temporary subcontracting necessitated by the strike did not
transcend the reasonable measures an employer may take in order to main-
tain operations in such circumstances." 19 The Board cited NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co." for this proposition, thus making temporary sub-
contracts a legitimate means for replacing economic strikers without imposing
a duty to bargain. In stating this proposition, the word "temporary" must be
emphasized because several years ago, in Hawaii Meat Co.,2 ' the Board
18
 This result is consistent with Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 28 L.R.R.M.
1162 (1951).
18
 Shell Oil Co., supra note 17, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1272. • ' ' •
28 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
21
 139 N.L.R.B. 966, 51 L.R.R.M. 1430 (1962).
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struck down the replacement of economic strikers by a permanent subcon-
tracting arrangement. 22 The distinction seems to be that, in Hawaii Meat, the
subcontracting eliminated union jobs and, therefore, was a change in "terms
and conditions of employment," whereas the Shell subcontracting did not
affect the bargaining unit, except in its power to exert economic pressure and
to preserve the business operation during the strike.
A third Shell Oil case,23 based on different facts, also imposes limitations
on an absolute duty to bargain. In this case, the employer gave the union two
days notice before transferring certain delivery operations to another plant.
Nevertheless, at the union's request, the employer met both before and after
the transfer and presented fully the economic reasons for the transfer. The
transfer did not change the size or work schedule of the bargaining unit. At
the outset of its opinion, the Board made this statement:
Our decision is based on the various facts in the instant case, in-
cluding the conduct of Respondent [employer], the nature of the
management determination, and the minimal effect of this deter-
rnination.24
Considering these factors, the Board found no 8(a) (5) violation. It conceded
that the two-days notice was short, but it said that this factor was offset by
the employer's willingness to bargain both before and after the change and the
lack of any substantial impact on the union. The Board also mentioned the
union's failure to offer any specific counterproposals and, perhaps more im-
portant, the absence of a commitment to any third party, so that the em-
ployer could have changed its mind. These facts were important evidence
substantiating the conclusion that the employer had bargained in good faith.
General Motors Corp. 25 involved the reassignment of certain drivers to
other jobs within the bargaining unit when their driving positions were given
to an independent contractor. The reassignments were effected through use of
contractual grievance procedures. The Board would not find an 8(a) (5)
violation because there was no substantial impairment of the bargaining unit,
and it felt that the employer had the right to make job reassignments. It was
also undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the issue was resolved by griev-
ance procedures.23 It is interesting to note that in both Shell Oil and General
Motors, the Board permitted subcontracting which did not substantially
impair the unit.
The most thoroughgoing subcontracting case is Westinghouse Elec.
22
 The circuit court refused to enforce the Board's order. 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.
1963). However, in light of Fibreboard, the Board's holding appears proper and should
be good law today.
23
 149 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 57 L.R.R.M. 1279 (1964).
24
 Id., 57 L.R.R.M. at 1280.
25 149 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 57 L.R.R.M. 1277 (1964),
23 The Board dismissed a failure-to-bargain complaint in Flintkote Co., 149
N.L.R.B. No. 136, 57 L.R.R.M. 1477 (1964). The dispute was over certain job changes
which the employer claimed were a matter of management prerogative. The controversy
was submitted to the grievance procedure, but just before arbitration the union brought
the refusal to bargain charge. Dismissal was based on the Board's policy of encouraging
settlement of contractual disputes by arbitration.
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Corp.,27 already noted in connection with the employer's continuing duty
to negotiate subcontracting at collective bargaining sessions and during the
life of the contract. The Board reversed the Trial Examiner, who found
a duty to bargain, basing his result on the Supreme Court's Fibreboard deci-
sion. The Board said that Fibreboard did not require bargaining in all sub-
contracting cases and that an employer was not obligated to bargain if it met
all the following tests:
1. The contracting out is motivated solely by economics.
2. Contracting out is a customary method by which the employer does
business.
3. The particular subcontracting in question does not vary significantly
in kind or degree from the customary subcontracting practices of the
employer.
4. The union had an opportunity to bargain about changes in existing
subcontracting practices at general negotiatory meetings.
5. There is no showing that the subcontracting will have a significant
impact on employees' job interests.29
Westinghouse met all these requirements, and no bargaining duty was found.
The Board also indicated that the presence of any of the following
factors would in itself create a duty to bargain:
1. Where the subcontracting involves a departure from previously
established operating methods.
2. Where it effects a change in conditions of employment.
3. Where it results in significant impairment of job tenure, employment
security, or reasonably anticipated work opportunities for those in
the unit. 2°
The reference to "reasonably anticipated work opportunities" may indi-
cate that the employer has a duty to bargain about contracting out work not
done by the unit, but which the unit contends it should do.
These cases have gone far toward the development of a mature body of
substantive law under the doctrine of Fibreboard. The employer must always
bargain in good faith when the union raises the issue of subcontracting for
general negotiations. This duty does not require the employer to give in, and,
as the Shell cases show, it may adamantly refuse to relent. This type of hard
bargaining is not in itself bad faith." But the employer may engage in uni-
lateral subcontracting only where it is his customary business practice to do
so or where it does not involve a substantial impairment of the bargaining
unit.
2. Employer's Decision To Go Out of Business
In 1956, shortly after the Textile Workers had successfully organized
the employees of Darlington Mfg. Co. in South Carolina, the board of direc-
27 Supra note 15.
28 Id., 58 L.R.R.M. at 1259.
20 Id., 58 L.R.R.M. at 1258.
80
 See the section on conduct of bargaining, infra p. 862.
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tors voted to liquidate the business. There was evidence that the liquidation
was motivated by the anti-union bias of Roger Milliken, controlling share-
holder of Deering Milliken, which in turn controlled Darlington. Roger
Milliken also served on the board of directors of Darlington. The newly
certified union brought unfair labor practice charges, and the Board found
violations of several sections, including 8(a) (3) and (5). 1 The Board
ruled that the closing down was discrimination aimed at discouraging union
membership at the Darlington plant, and that the circumstances disclosed a
refusal to bargain with the certified representative of the employees. The
Board further found that Darlington was a member of an affiliated group of
plants controlled by Deering Milliken and that the group constituted a
"single employer." Hence, its remedial order could extend to Deering Milliken.
From this finding, the Board concluded that Darlington had not completely
terminated business, and it ordered reinstatement of Darlington employees in
plants in South Carolina or adjacent states, with back pay to run until the
employees obtained substantially equivalent employment or were placed on
preferential hiring lists at the other plants.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that Darlington could go out of
business for any reason at all, including anti-union animus, and that this
absolute right extended to partial closings as wel1. 2 Thus, whether or not
Darlington was an independent employer, the closing down did not constitute
an unfair labor practice.
The Supreme Court, in its recent disposition of the case, reached a con-
clusion different from both the Board's and the court of appeals' and prob-
ably a surprise to both. The Court said:
We hold that so far as the Labor Act is concerned, an employer has
the absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he
pleases, but disagree with the Court of Appeals that such right
includes the ability to close part of a business no matter what the
reason.3
The Court then remanded the case, already disputed for nine years, to the
Board for additional findings.
In rejecting the union's contention that an employer may not close down
completely for any reason whatever, the Court examined the argument in the
framework of section 8(a) (3), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer—
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage mem-
bership in any labor organization... . 4
As the Court saw it, "one of the purposes of the Labor Act is to prohibit the
discriminatory use of economic weapons in an effort to obtain future bene-
I Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 51 L.R.R.M. 1278 (1962).
2 Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963).
3 Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., — U.S. —, 33 U.S.L. Week 4292, 4293
(1965).
4 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended by 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(Supp. V, 1964).
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fits."5 (Emphasis added.) Thus, a discriminatory lockout or a "runaway shop"
may yield benefits by discouraging future union activity, but a complete,
bona fide termination yields no prospects of future discouragement of union
membership. Even though the closing is vindictive and makes the employees
of the closed plant suffer, it is not section 8(a) (3) discrimination, absent the
motive to achieve future benefit.°
Since the Board ruled that Darlington, Deering Milliken, et al., were a
"single employer," the Court could not rest its decision on the foregoing
discussion of complete termination, but had to establish a rule governing the
closing of one of several plants. Keeping in mind the necessity of finding a
"future benefit," the Court said that the Board erred in considering only the
impact on Darlington employees. Instead, the Court said that
a partial closing is an unfair labor practice under § 8(a) (3) if
motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining
plants of the single employer and if the employer may reasonably
have foreseen that such a closing will likely have that effect?
In explaining its test, the Court did not feel it necessary to find an "organiza-
tional integration" of the plants or corporations, as the Board had. It estab-
lished the following test:
If the persons exercising control over a plant that is being closed
for anti-union reasons (I) have an interest in another business,
whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the same line of com-
mercial activity as the closed plant, of sufficient substantiality to
give promise of their reaping a benefit from the discouragement of
unionization in that business; (2) act to close their plant with the
purpose of producing such a result; and (3) occupy a relationship
to the other business which makes it realistically foreseeable that its
employees will fear that such business will also be closed down if
they persist in organizational activities, we think that an unfair
labor practice has been made outs (Emphasis added.)
In short, the Court requires that the employer have an interest which would
benefit by discouraging union membership, that the closing be motivated to
achieve that benefit, and that the employer occupy a relationship to employees
in the other plants such that its action will reasonably produce the effect of
"chilling" union activity.° Applying the test to the present case, the Court
6
 Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., supra note 3, 33 U.S.L. Week, at 4294.
6
 Ibid. In a footnote, the Court discussed NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, 327 F.2d 370
(2d Cir. 1964), and NLRB v. Missouri Transit Co., 250 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1957), which
the Board urged were indistinguishable from Darlington. In both, however, the Court
found a discriminatory motive to discourage future union organization.
7
 Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., supra note 3, 33 U.S.L. Week, at 4295.
8 Ibid.
0
 The Court's use of the word "persist" in its test raises some questions. If employees,
in a plant controlled by an employer who has just closed another plant, have never
attempted to organize, is the shutdown discriminatory? Or, to put the question another
way, must the employer's effort to discourage unionism be aimed at a specific target?
The question is probably answered in the negative because the Court continually
emphasized "future benefits." However, it should be recognized that the problems of
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said that the Board had found proper interest and relationship, but that it
had not properly considered the purpose and effect of the shutdown. Thus,
it remanded the case to the Board for further findings. And since the circuit
court had not considered any of these issues, it will be open to it to review
all findings.
In light of the facts discussed in its decision in Darlington, it is unlikely
that the Board will have much difficulty finding the required elements of
purpose and effect. The Textile Workers were attempting to get a foothold in
the South, and the employer certainly realized that there would be future
attempts to organize other plants and that the plant closing would severely
discourage these attempts."
3. Remedies
When the Supreme Court ruled on Fibreboard v. NLRB' and found a
violation of section 8(a)(5), it approved the Board's remedy, which ordered
the employer to resume performance of the subcontracted operation and
reinstate the discharged employees with back pay. This type of remedy is
known as restoring the status quo ante, because it is the Board's attempt to
return conditions of employment to what they were before the employer com-
mitted his unfair labor practice. The Board has used this remedy in numerous
subcontracting cases since Town & Country.2
The power to order so sweeping a remedy is found in Section 10(c) of
the NLRA, which gives the Board the right "to take such affirmative action,
including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effec-
tuate the policies of this subchapter."3 Thus, the Board has consistently been
allowed to fashion its remedy so as to minimize the effect of an unfair labor
practice, and its order will stand where it effectuates the policies of the NLRA,
even though the order may have some punitive effect. In NLRB v. Seven-Up
Bottling Co., Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that the approach for the Court
to take in reviewing a Board order is not to consider whether it is remedial or
punitive but, rather, whether it bears appropriate relation to the policies of
the act. Mr. Justice Frankfurter also said in this case that the Board is not
confined solely to the record of the proceeding in fashioning its remedy, but
may draw upon its experience and expertise. Nevertheless, the Board must
consider circumstances that would make its usual remedy oppressive in the
particular case and, therefore, not calculated to further the policies of the
act.4
proving anti-union motivation are more difficult where there have been no attempts to
organize other plants.
10 The Supreme Court's decision, particularly its discussion of section 8(a)(3) and
the requirement of proving motive, is treated further in the section on lockouts, infra
p. 871.
1 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 49 L.R.R.M. 1918 (1962). See also, Hawaii Meat Co., 139
N.L.R.B. 966, 51 L.R.R.M. 1430 (1962); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 550,
51 L.R,R.M. 1101 (1962); Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 815, 50 L.R.R.M. 1281
(1962).
8 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958).
4 344 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1953).
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This warning is a clear indication that restoration of the status quo ante
may not always be the appropriate remedy, and that in some cases the em-
ployer's unilateral action violating the duty to bargain should be allowed
to stand. Thus, a Iine of cases has developed in which employers have avoided
reestablishment of a business operation and reinstatement of employees by
showing that such a remedy would be unduly oppressive.
In The Renton News Record, 5 a newspaper subcontracted certain print-
ing processes because it was unable to compete and was faced with a need to
automate. The Board found a failure to bagain, but would not order resump-
tion of the processes or reinstatement. It noted that the change was motivated
by extreme economic necessity, and that without it the newspaper would be
unable to compete and would have to go out of business. The Board also
deemed it important that the change involved a totally different process and
that it required participation of other newspapers not parties to the proceed-
ing, in order for all the parties to succeed. Therefore, restoration of the status
quo ante would be detrimental to third parties and an unjust punishment of
Renton. The Board's only order was that the employer bargain about the
effects of the termination of operations upon the employees.
Another approach was taken in Winn-Dixie Stores,° where the employer's
discontinuance of an operation without notifying the union violated sec-
tion 8(a) (5). The Board noted that there was no necessity for the change, and
that no outside interests would be injured if it ordered resumption of opera-
tions. Nevertheless, it refused to do so, because, in taking into account what it
called "practical considerations," the Board found such an order unnecessary.
It noted the broad scope of the employer's general business operations (super-
markets) and the possibility of employing the displaced employees elsewhere
in these operations. It also said that the discontinued operation might now be
outmoded. Consequently, the Board ordered only that the employer bargain
about whether the operation should be continued and, if not, about its effect
on the employees, and that the displaced employees be awarded back pay
until the employer fulfilled its bargaining duty.'
Plant-closing cases have presented a difficult problem in selecting the
appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court's decision in Darlington° limits the
occasions when a plant closing may violate section 8, but since findings of
violations are still likely, discussion of remedies is appropriate.
In Savoy Laundry° the Board ordered resumption of operations where a
partial closing down was intended to frustrate union organization. It also
ordered reinstatement of employees with back pay, until an offer of
reinstatement was made. The Second Circuit refused to order the resumption
of operations because Savoy had not performed the service for three years and
had lost its patronage. On the issue of back pay, the court remanded for the
5
 136 N.L.R.B. 1294, 49 L.R.R.M. 1972 (1962).
a 147 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 56 L.R.R.M. 1256 (1964).
7
 Back pay was ordered because the unfair labor practice had caused the loss of
employment which bargaining might have prevented.
8
 Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., —U.S. —, 33 U.S.L. Week 4292. (1965).
9
 137 N.L.R.B. 306, 50 L.R.R.M. 1127 (1962).
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Board to set a time limitation." The Board, on remand, issued the same
back pay order and expressed its belief that the order did not subject the
employer to indefinite payments. The Board said:
discriminatees will be required to make a reasonable search for work
during periods of unemployment; [and] back pay will not accrue
during periods when a discriminatee is unable to work or otherwise
out of the labor market...."
The Board feels that an employer may not initially protest its back pay order,
even though unlimited in time, but must wait until circumstances arise which
would make continuance of back pay infeasible and unduly burdensome."
In Star Baby Co.,' two partners dissolved the partnership, terminated
operations, and disposed of the business assets. The Board would not order
resumption of operations, but commanded that the employees be placed on a
preferential hiring list, and be offered the first jobs if either or both partners
resumed operations. Back pay was awarded from the time of dissolution, even
though the employees were out on strike. While the Board usually requires a
request for reinstatement before it will compute back pay, it recognized that
such a requirement would be futile in this case. It also noted that although
its back pay order was to run until employees obtained substantially equiva-
lent employment, individual employees must, nevertheless, make good faith
efforts to minimize the back pay obligation.
In Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., the employer decided to shutdown "before
its obligation to bargain with the union matured." 14 (Emphasis in original.)
The decision was motivated by the lack of heating, lighting or sanitary
facilities, which the employer was unable to fix because workers would not
cross the union picket line, and the union would not remove the line to permit
the work. Under these circumstances, the employer was ordered to bargain
with the union only in the event it reopened the plant, and then to offer
employment to those workers who lost their jobs when the plant closed.
One of the broadest Board orders, short of an order to reopen, was that
in Darlington Mfg. Co." Darlington, Deering Milliken, and several affiliate
corporations were held to constitute a "single employer." Consequently, the
Board order extended to the entire group, not just Darlington. Important
elements of the order were:
1. Darlington must bargain with the union and offer to reinstate its old
employees if the plant reopens.
2. Copies of the order must be mailed directly to each employee to
constitute adequate notice of the decision.
3. Back pay must be given to the employees until they are able to find
substantially equivalent employment, or placed on preferential hiring
lists at other employer plants.
10
 NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, Inc., 327 F.2d 370 (1964).
tt 148 N.L.R.B. No, 5, 56 L.R.R.M. 1450, 1451 (1964).
12 Ibid.
/ 3
 140 N.L.R.B. 678, 52 L.R.R.M. 1094 (1963).
14 145 N.L.R.R. 785, 786, 55 L.R.R.M. 1051, 1052 (1964).
15
 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 51 L.R.R.M. 1278 (1962).
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4. Deering Milliken and its affiliates must offer employment to the dis-
charged employees in their other mills in South Carolina or adjacent
states. However, this order would not require dismissal of employees
with less seniority in these other plants.
5. Employees who do not thus acquire jobs are to be placed on prefer-
ential hiring lists.
6. The employer must pay travel and moving expenses for relocated
employees.
The same sweeping order was made in New England Web," with the
addition that the Board ordered reinstatement of the displaced employees as
a group and that, whether or not the plant reopened or the employees obtained
jobs elsewhere in affiliated plants, the old union was to retain its integrity and
continue to bargain for them. This seems excessive, but the First Circuit, in
reversing, declined to discuss remedy, inasmuch as it could find no unfair
labor practice.17
In Royal Plating & Polishing Co.,i 8
 the employer shut down solely for
economic reasons. With this in mind, the Trial Examiner, although finding a
failure to bargain, would not order back pay and recommended only that a
preferential hiring list be drawn up in the event the plant should reopen. In
his opinion, a back pay order would be punitive. The Board disagreed,
stating that such an order would be appropriate, even though the shutdown
was not discriminatory. It noted that the cessation of business and sale of
assets would make an order to resume operations unfair, but that these factors
did not excuse the failure to bargain. Thus, back pay was the proper remedy
to make the employees whole for their loss resulting from the unfair labor
practice."
In summary, an order to restore the status quo ante will continue as the
appropriate remedy where the employer commits an unfair labor practice in
its subcontracting or partial shutdown. Where extenuating circumstances
make this remedy unduly harsh or impractical, the order will be mitigated. In
plant-closing cases where there is an unfair labor practice, an order to reopen
would be extremely harsh. So far, the Board has been content to award back
pay and to order the employer to offer the discharged workers jobs at affiliated
plants.
4. Conduct During Negotiations
One of the most perplexing problems in labor law is the determination
whether the parties are bargaining in good faith. Sections 8(a) (5) and
8(b) (3) of the NLRA require good faith bargaining from both the employer
and union.' Section 8(d) defines good faith collective bargaining as "the
la 135 N.L.R.B. 1019, 49 L.R.R.M. 1620 (1962).
17
 NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696 (1962).
18
 148 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 57 L.R.R.M. 1006 (1964).
19 The order was limited so as not to extend beyond the time when the employer
had a legal duty to vacate the premises because of a contract with the local municipal
housing authority.
1 Section 8(a) (5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer-
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performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative
of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment .. .
but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession." 2 In short, the parties must meet and
bargain, but they need not agree. Under these circumstances, the problem of
determining what is good faith bargaining has consistently plagued both the
Board and the courts. Several recent cases have shed some light on what facts
and circumstances must be weighed in considering whether the totality of an
employer's conduct violates section 8(a) (5).
In Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 3 the union and employer had eleven meetings
after certification and agreed on many major questions, such as grievance
and arbitration procedures. In the eleventh meeting the employer presented
what it termed its final offer. Because of an objectionable seniority clause the
union would not agree. Seven meetings followed in which neither party
would budge from its position; then the union struck. After more negotiations,
the employer permanently replaced struck workers. The Trial Examiner
found that the employer's submission of its "final offer" constituted a refusal
to bargain and that this led to the strike. Consequently, it was an unfair labor
practice strike, and all striking workers had to be reinstated. The Board
differed sharply because it felt that the Trial Examiner had over-stressed the
finality of the offer. The Board pointed out that the offer had been preceded
by eleven fruitful sessions in which agreement had been reached on most
problems. Viewed in this context, there was no failure to bargain in stating
the position beyond which the employer would not go, nor could the Board
find any conduct evidencing bad faith in the negotiations following the offer
but before the strike.4
In NLRB v. American Aggregate Co.,5 the Board had initiated a civil
contempt proceeding on the ground that the employer did not comply in good
faith with its order to bargain. There were thirty-two bargaining sessions at
which both employer and union stood fast by their positions. The court said:
[The record shows that] . . . management was merely endeavoring
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject
to the provisions of section 9(a).
Section 8(b) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union—
to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representa-
tive of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a).
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1958).
2 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
	 158(d) (1958).
3
 140 N.L.R.B. 1103, 52 L.R.R.M. 1184 (1963).
4
 A violation of section 8(a) (5) was found because the employer insisted to the
point of impasse upon an illegal super-seniority clause. However, this impasse was not
reached until several months after the strike by which time the bulk of strikers had
been permanently replaced. Consequently, only a small number of employees were
unfair labor practice strikers. The decision was enforced, with a few unimportant
exceptions, in Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1964).
5 335 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1964).
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. . . to have the bargaining go as it wished it to do rather than
being required to yield to the views of • .. the union."
The Board apparently disapproved of the terms sought by management and
felt it was refusing to agree to reasonable union demands. But the court
would have no part in allowing Board supervision of substantive terms of the
agreement. It stated:
[N]either board nor court has any power or function to order or
compel management to agree to particular clauses or demands
merely because the Labor Board or a court might think that the
refusal was unreasonable.'
It concluded that the Board's function is to supervise the negotiating process.
And since there was no evidence of anti-union animus or attempt not to reach
agreement, the court would not find a failure to bargain merely from adher-
ence to the same offer.
A third "hard bargaining" case, Dierks Forests,s affords perhaps the
most comprehensive look at what factors are considered in conduct of bargain-
ing cases. The Board accorded significance to the following factors in refusing
to find a failure to bargain:
1. The employer met with the union whenever requested.
2. There was no overt evidence of anti-union hostility.
3. In rejecting union proposals, the employer offered numerous counter-
proposals.
4. The employer discussed all proposals at length.
5. When the employer remained adamant on a proposal, it fully
explained its position.
6. During negotiations the parties reached agreement on 54 of the 62
proposals submitted, and three proposals were withdrawn.
7. The employer made significant concessions concerning seniority and
grievance procedure.
8. There was a per se violation of section 8(a) (5) in the employer's
failure to supply information concerning wages, but in consideration
of all other factors, this alone was not enough to sustain the finding
of a refusal to bargain in the totality of the employer's conduct . 9
At this point, it is perfectly clear that totality of bargaining conduct
cases involve a careful weighing of all the facts related to the bargaining
process. The proper approach is to examine the employer's conduct and
determine whether its subjective intent was to reach agreement with the
union or to put off agreement and derogate from the union's position as
representative of the employees by making agreement impossible. The list of
elements in Dierks Forests is by no means exclusive or exhaustive, and, con-
ceivably, any or all of the items mentioned may be absent in a given case.
6 Id. at 254.
7 Id. at 255.
8
 148 N.L.R.B. No. 92, 57 L.R.R.M. 1086 (1964).
9 Id., 57 L.R.R.M. at 1089-90.
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It is also evident from Philip Carey and Dierks Forests that a per se viola-
tion of section 8(a) (5) may not by itself be enough to find a section 8(a) (5)
violation based on totality of conduct.
Probably the most publicized bargaining conduct case of the year is
General Electric Co." There, the Board found an overall refusal to bargain
based on a number of significant factors. There were several per se violations
of section 8(a) (5), including (1) failure to supply data requested by the
union, (2) attempts by the employer to deal with individual locals while
engaging in national negotiations, and (3) presentation of the personal acci-
dent insurance proposal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In viewing GE's
overall bargaining approach, the Board was impressed not only with these
facts but also with a number of others, including GE's system of communica-
tions to its employees and its bargaining technique.
The Communications System. GE had developed a highly perfected
communications system which it used extensively to gain support for its
positions. Before negotiations, GE initiated a hard drive to arouse employee
support. During negotiations, it used its communications system to criticize
the union's demands and the motives of its leaders. It also unleashed a deluge
of propaganda with the obvious intent of inducing employees to pressure the
union into acceptance of company proposals. The Board had little trouble
finding this a thinly disguised attempt to deal with the union through its
employees rather than vice-versa. The Board said:
On the part of the employer, . . . [good faith bargaining] requires
at a minimum recognition that the statutory representative is the
one with whom it must deal in conducting bargaining negotiations,
and that it can no longer bargain directly or indirectly with the
employees."
The Bargaining Technique. GE had a policy of doing year-round research
to determine what was "right" for its employees. It would then listen to union
demands and arguments, and, after studying its own and union statistics, it
would submit in full its final offer. It would not change even the smallest item
unless new information subsequently came to light. It is not perfectly clear
whether the Board disapproved of this technique. It seems more likely that
what the Board most strongly objected to was GE's attitude, and that to the
extent GE's bargaining technique reflected this attitude, the Board disap-
proved of it. GE's attitude was that it knew best what was right for the em-
ployees, and that it was not overly concerned with what the union thought or
about conducting employee relations through the union. To this extent, it was
not bargaining. The union's job is to represent the employees and protect their
interests. The employer is in a sense an adversary, and this technique of bar-
gaining, when coupled with the other elements of the case, evinced an attitude
of unwillingness to work with the union in solving employment problems.
It is not to be understood that a technique of presenting an offer at the
outset and refusing to budge is a refusal to bargain. But, like all conduct of
10
 150 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 57 L.R.R,M. 1491 (1964). The case is given further
treatment in Note, infra p. 949.
Id., 57 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
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the parties, this technique is evidence on that issue, and, when the facts show,
as they did in General Electric, an unwillingness to work together and recog-
nize the union's true purpose, the technique is an element of the violation.
In contrast, the technique of bargaining found in Bethlehem Steel Co.
(Shipbuilding Division)," although similar to GE's in many respects, was
upheld. There, the employer opened negotiations by stating its belief that
business would fall off and expressing an immediate need to cut costs, in
particular, the high labor costs, in order to meet the strong challenges of
competitors. The employer explained that it had spent three and one-half
months researching and preparing its statements, which were "designed at
convincing union representatives." 13
 Throughout hotly contested negotiations,
the employer held fast to its position. Ultimately, the union took the matter
before the Board. The Trial Examiner in an exhaustive, thoughtful opinion
found no violation. In his opinion he said:
I see the main theory to be that Respondent [employer] could not
lawfully demand as much as it did and adamantly insist upon all
of it, without yielding at al1. 14
But the Trial Examiner would not subscribe to such a theory. He said there
must be "something more" than a refusal to budge. The "something more"
may be conduct indicative of anti-union hostility or intent not to reach
agreement or rejection of the collective bargaining principle. Or the "some-
thing more" may be found in the nature or character of the demands them-
selves." In any event, the Trial Examiner thought it lacking in Bethlehem
Steel.
It is most significant that the employer's research and negotiations were
aimed at "convincing union representatives," not at determining what is
"right" for employees in spite of union demands. True, the employer was
diametrically opposed to union demands and refused to yield, but, neverthe-
less, in trying to persuade the union to adopt its position, it was bargaining.
At the heart of the matter is the attitude of the employer as demonstrated by
its conduct. On the one hand, Bethlehem Steel, convinced of future economic
difficulties, made an intensive effort to persuade the union, while refusing to
budge from what it considered the best it could offer. On the other hand,
General Electric disparaged the union and sought to provide for its employees
without dealing with the union. In short, Bethlehem was bargaining hard;
GE was hardly bargaining.
5. Per Se Violations
In addition to the requirement that an employer's general conduct be in
good faith, there is also a line of cases in which the employer has been found
to violate section 8(a) (5) by a single act. The theory in such cases is that
the act or refusal has such a vital effect on the bargaining process and so
12 133 N.L.R.B. 1347, 49 L.R.R.M. 1016 (1961).
13
 Id., 133 N.L.R.B. at 1368.
14 Id., 133 N.L.R.B. at 1369. The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's report,
incorporating it into its opinion.
15 Ibid.
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impairs the union's bargaining rights that it must be remedied before good
faith bargaining can result. Thus, the conduct is considered a per se violation
of the duty to bargain.
One of the most controversial issues in the per se refusal to bargain
area is under what circumstances the employer must supply the union with
information exclusively within his control. Section 8(d) requires employer
and union to bargain "with respect to wages, hours and other terms and con-
ditions of employment,"' and the Borg-Warner rule= has made bargaining on
those subjects mandatory. However, bargaining presupposes an ability on the
part of the union to represent the employees intelligently and capably, and it
is readily admitted that the union cannot satisfactorily perform this function
unless supplied by management with data pertaining to wages, hours, terms
and conditions of employment which are not otherwise available to it. Thus,
the Board and courts have imposed a duty upon the employer to provide the
required informations Nevertheless, problems have arisen about what infor-
mation must be supplied, whether a claim of privilege will excuse the em-
ployer's failure to perform, 4 whether the union may waive its right to acquire
information, and about whether the union must have an express purpose in
mind when it requests the data.
In Fafnir Bearing Co.,5 the union requested permission to make inde-
pendent time studies in order to determine whether to arbitrate several em-
ployee grievances relating to the employer's standard production rates. The
grievances claimed that rates were too high and cut down on incentive bene-
fits. The employer based its refusal on three grounds: (1) the union had access
to the employer's time study data; (2) the union.had no contractual right to
make the time study; and (3) the arbitrator would conduct his own time
study to determine the merit of the grievances. The Board found that the time
study was relevant and necessary to enable the union intelligently to deter-
mine whether the grievances warranted arbitration. The employer's data was
judged incomplete and not satisfactory for the union's purposes. The Board
also took care to point out that the right to make the time study is not con-
tractual, but is statutory, arising from the reciprocal duties to bargain. The
Board noted that this statutory right may be waived, but it said that such
waiver must be "clear and unmistakable." That the arbitrator would perform
a time study was judged irrelevant because the union needed the information
1 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).
2 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
3 NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) ; Whitin Mach. Works, 108
N.L.R.B. 1537, 34 L.R,R.M. 1251 (1954), aff'd, 217 F,2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 905 (1955).
4 In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 58 L.R.R.M. 1298 (1965), the
employer was required to submit information, including names of the policy holders
upon whose complaints the company had discharged certain employees, to enable the
union to process grievances. The employer's claim that the names were privileged and
confidential was unavailing.
5 146 N.L.R.B. No. 179, 56 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1964). The case is presently before the
Second Circuit. The union sought to intervene in the appellate proceeding, but the court
denied the motion, granting leave for the union to file a brief as amicus curiae. Fafnir
Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 801 (1964)4 The Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari on the intervention question. 33 U.S.L. Week 3322 (March 30, 1965).
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for the very purpose of determining whether or not to arbitrate. Since there
were no alternative means of obtaining the information, 6 and since the time
studies would not impair the employer's business operations,7 the employer
was ordered to permit such studies.
In contrast to the Board's approach in Fafnir, a majority of the Board
refused to enforce union requests for information relating to wages in Ana-
conda American Brass Co. 8
 The employer used a point system to evaluate and
classify each job. Different elements involved in performance of the job were
assigned different point values, and the job was classified and assigned mini-
mum and maximum wage rates. The contract gave the union the right to
examine job classification information, but made no mention of the right to
know how many points were assigned to each element of the job in arriving
at that classification. In the contract negotiation sessions, the union specifi-
cally refused to negotiate the mutual determination of a point system. During
the contract period, the crane operation was changed and the operator's classi-
fication lowered. The operator filed a grievance, and his old classification was
restored. Some time later the union filed a second grievance seeking disclosure
of the point system relating to the crane operator's job.
The Board's denial of relief was principally based on a finding that the
union's demands were not relevant either to a pending grievance or to the
general administration of the contract. Thus, the Board believed that the
union's request was not reasonably related to its duty to bargain. In addition,
the Board seemed to indicate that the union had waived its right to the in-
formation by its contractual agreement limiting what kind of job classification
data would be made available by the employer.
The dissent, by Member Fanning, pointed out that the waiver of a
statutory right must be "clear and unmistakable," and should not be implied
from equivocal conduct. Member Fanning also disagreed on the relevancy
test. In his view, relevancy should not depend on the union's contract rights,
nor should it be required that the request be relevant to an immediate pur-
pose. Since the right is statutory, the only requirements should be that the
request be made in good faith and pertain to information regarding wages,
hours, terms and conditions of employment.
The position taken by the dissent in Anaconda American Brass was first
stated in Whitin Machine Works° in a concurring opinion by Chairman
Farmer. It was his belief that because of the vast multitude of this type of
case coming before the Board, a clear-cut rule should be laid down. He sug-
gested that the test should be whether the information is material to the entire
collective bargaining process and whether the request is made in good faith.
In NLRB v. Otis Elevator Operator Co., 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1953), the court
refused to enforce a Board-ordered time study because the union had other reasonable
methods by which to obtain the information.
7
 The employer had argued that the working areas of its plant should be free from
disturbance, citing the no-solicitation rule of Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B.
615, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110 (1962).. However, the Board ruled that in the absence of
evidence of particular harmful circumstances the time studies were not an unreasonable
burden. Fafnir Bearing Co., supra note 5, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1111.
8
 148 N.L.R,B. No. 55, 57 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1964).
9
 Supra note 3.
868
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
Thus, if the data bear a substantial relationship to wages, hours, terms and
conditions of employment, it should be made available without regard to its
immediate relationship to the negotiation or administration of the collective
bargaining contract.
Following the Whitin case, several circuit courts adopted the broad ap-
proach to relevancy, either citing Chairman Farmer's concurrence or giving
the majority opinion an equally broad construction.'° In Boston Herald-
Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, the First Circuit said:
the Board stated a general rule that, in effect, linked wage data is
always presumptively relevant to collective bargaining. The request-
ing union need not show the precise relevance of the information to
particular issues under discussion."
In Hercules Motor Corp., 12 the Board imposed a limitation on the union's
right to demand relevant information. The union sought time study and job
evaluation data in order to prepare a grievance. The employer, however,
denied that the dispute was covered by the contractual grievance procedure,
and, therefore, denied the relevancy of the data to the union's duty to admin-
ister the contract. The Board agreed with the employer that before the union
could pursue its request for related data, it must invoke the contractual
machinery to determine whether a grievance exists. This approach appears to
retreat from a rule which would permit the union to request data without
stating the relevant purpose for which it is desired. Thus, with Hercules, the
test apparently became not merely whether the requested data are relevant to
subjects of mandatory bargaining, but whether they are relevant to the union's
purpose, which, in turn, must be a part of the bargaining process.
Anaconda American Brass indicates that the relevancy test of Hercules
retains its vitality. Although Hercules may be rationalized on the procedural
ground that the union's request was not timely, the result reached presumes a
duty on the union to explain the purpose for its request. And only by conced-
ing such a duty could Anaconda have resulted in a finding inimical to the
union. Whether or not explanation of purpose is a valid condition precedent
to the union's statutory right may be doubted. Presumably, the final word will
have to come from the Supreme Court.
Even if the information requested is relevant, the union may waive its
right to make the request. In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB,' 3 the em-
ployer claimed that a waiver had resulted when the union submitted a collec-
tive bargaining proposal that the employer be required to supply certain in-
formation, and later dropped the proposal. The Sixth Circuit refused to extend
the Jacobs Mfg. doctrine" to this case, because that doctrine applies only to
contractual rights, not to those arising from statute. But a waiver will occur
if the company's refusal to supply information constitutes a grievance under
10 Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955) ; NLRB
v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955).
11 Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 10, at 60.
12 136 N.L.R.B. 1648, 50 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1962).
is 325 F.2d 746 (Gth Cir. 1963).
14 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 28 L.R.R.M. 1162 (1951), aff'd, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952),
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the contract. Then the union must adhere to the bargaining procedures, and
may not complain of a per se refusal to bargain. In short, Timken reiterates
the proposition that a waiver of the statutory right to relevant information
must be "clear and unmistakable.715
Another problem in the area of per se violations of the bargaining duty is
whether either party may insist or refuse to the point of impasse on having
a stenographer present at bargaining sessions. In Reed & Prince,' the Board
said:
The presence of a stenographer at such negotiations is not conducive
to the friendly atmosphere so necessary for the successful termina-
tion of the negotiations. . . . The insistence by the [employer] in
this case upon the presence of a steno-typist at the bargaining meet-
ings is, in our opinion, further evidence of its bad faith."
The First Circuit disagreed, saying that insistence on a steno-typist was not
evidence of bad faith. 18 In subsequent cases, "the legality of insisting upon a
stenographic typist at bargaining sessions has been determined in the light of
the entire bargaining context rather than on a per se basis." 1° In an interesting
reversal of roles, the company in St. Louis Typographical Union (Graphic
Arts Assoc.),2° filed a section 8 (b) (3) charge that the union's refusal to
permit a stenographer was bad faith bargaining. The Board used a factual
approach and found no bad faith because (1) there was a long history of
harmonious relations between the union and employer; (2) there had been no
recording of bargaining sessions during the last ten years; (3) the union could
reasonably fear that the employer would breach its confidence because there
was evidence that such a breach had occurred when a stenographer was last
used; (4) the presence of a stenographer imposed a certain amount of
restraint on the negotiators; and (5) the union was willing to discuss the issue
with management in private. Graphic Arts intimates that the employer's
insistence would violate section 8(a) (5) where made in order to impede
effective negotiation.
In another recent case, NLRB v. Southern Coach & Body Co., 21 the
Fifth Circuit held that where the employer had a longstanding policy of grant-
ing automatic wage increases to new employees after three and six months of
service, it was not a violation of section 8(a) (5) for the employer to continue
such wage increases after unionization. Although an employer may not uni-
laterally change a condition of employment, these facts did not show such a
change, but merely a continuation of an existing and established policy.
15
 See also, NLRB v. Perkins Mach. Co., 326 F.2d 488, 489 (1st Cir. 1964), where
the court said that a waiver should be express, and that a mere inference, no matter how
strong, should be insufficient.
16 96 N.L.R.13. 850, 28 L.R.R.M. 1608 (1951).
17
 Id. at 854, 28 L.R.R.M. at 1610.
18 NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1953).
19
 E.g., Allis-Chalmers, 106 N.L.R,B. 939, 32 L.R.R.M. 1585 (1953). The quote is
from St. Louis Typographical Union, 149 N.L.R.B, No. 71, 57 L.R.R.M. 1370, 1371
(1964).
29
 Supra note 19.
21 336 F.2d 214 (1964).
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B. EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION—THE ECONOMIC LOCKOUT
In a year of crucial commentary on the development of labor-manage-
ment relations, three Supreme Court cases, dealing with the important issues
of what economic weapons may be used by an employer and what is the
NLRB's function in making such a determination, appear to be the most
significant policy decisions by that Court in a number of years. Two of the
cases involved lockouts aimed at preserving the employer's bargaining posi-
tion; the third dealt with the closely akin problem of plant closings.'
In American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 2 the union and employer were
unable to reach agreement in negotiations for a new collective bargaining
contract. The old contract expired, and after the parties had reached a bar-
gaining impasse, the employer locked out his employees, attempting by eco-
nomic pressure to compel union agreement with his demands. The union
charged that this conduct violated sections 8(a) (1) and (3), 3 but the Trial
Examiner found that the employer had reasonable grounds to fear a strike
and that the lockout was justifiable to prevent the unusual economic loss
which would result from such a strike. The Board expressly found that the
employer's fear of a strike was unreasonable, and that the lockout was an
interference with section 7 rights violating section 8(a) (1).4 The Board also
found that the lockout discriminated against union membership and violated
section 8(a) (3), even though there was no anti-union motive. The court of
appeals sustained these findings.°
The Supreme Court felt not only that the Board had misread the statute
and prior case law, but also that it had misconceived its function in the super-
vision of labor-management disputes.° The Court defined the issue as whether
the employer commits an unfair labor practice when it invokes "the use of a
temporary layoff of employees solely as a means to bring economic pressure
to bear in support of the employer's bargaining position, after impasse has
been reached."' The Board had held that the lockout interfered with the
employees' section 7 rights to bargain collectively and to strike. The Court
noted a lack of evidence that the employer had sought to escape bargaining or
to punish his employees for bargaining, or that the lockout had even impaired
the right to bargain. True, the lockout applied powerful economic pressure
1 The plant closing case, Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., — U.S. —, 33
U.S.L. Week 4292 (1965), has already been discussed in connection with the employer's
duty to bargain, supra p, 856.
2 — U.S.	 33 U.S.L. Week 4273 (1965).
Sections 8(a) (1) and (3) make it an unfair labor practice for an employer —
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed by section 7 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization. . . .
61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended by 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1), (3)
(Supp. V, 1964).
4 American Ship Bldg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362, 53 L.R.R.M. 1245 (1963).
5 NLRB v. American Ship Bldg. Co., 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
6 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 2.
I Id., 33 U.S.L. Week at 4275.
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against the employees, but it did not affect their right or ability to bargain in
any way forbidden by statute. "Nor is the lockout one of those acts which
is demonstrably so destructive of collective bargaining that the Board need not
inquire into employer motivation. . . "8 In essence, the Court seemed to take
the position that economic suffering undergone by a union in pursuit of eco-
nomic benefit will not in itself be the predicate of an employer unfair labor
practice.
On the charge of interference with the right to strike, the Court stated
that the right is only "to cease work—nothing more" and does not include the
right to determine when and how long the work stoppage will occur.° Thus,
the lockout in support of a legitimate bargaining position did not violate
section 8(a) (1).
This brought the Court to the section 8(a) (3) charge. It noted that
illegal discrimination generally requires proof of the employer's• motivation.
But, the Court said:
This is not to deny that there are some practices which are inher-
ently so prejudicial to union interests and so devoid of significant
economic justification that no specific evidence of intent to dis-
courage union membership or other antiunion animus is required. In
some cases, it may be that the employer's conduct carries with it an
inference of unlawful intention so compelling that it is justifiable to
disbelieve the employer's protestations of innocent purpose?'
The Court did not think that this was such a case because a lockout does not
necessarily tend to discourage union membership, and if it did in this case,
it did so only indirectly?' The real purpose of the lockout was to pressure the
union into modifying its demands, and discriminatory effects were not so
foreseeable as to dispense with proof of motivation.
The Court might have concluded at this point, but it went on, severely
castigating the Board's handling of the case. In past rulings, the Board had
as a matter of policy justified lockouts only where certain "operative" or
"economic" conditions prevailed. The Court said that this approach ignored
the requirement of intent to discourage union membership or otherwise to
discriminate against the union. There must be proof of such intent to sustain
8 Ibid.
0
 Id., 33 U.S.L. Week at 4276,
1 ° Ibid. The Court cited Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S 17 (1954), and
NLRB v. Eric Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
11
 Mr, Justice Harlan apparently took the approach in the Darlington case, supra
note 1, that section 8(a) (1) could not be violated by an act not Inherently discriminatory
without first proving the motivation necessary for proof of a section 8(a) (3) violation.
Conversely, it is likely that no act violates section 8(a) (3) without proof of motive
unless it also violates section 8(a)(1). Compare this statement from NLRB v. Brown,
— U.S. —, 33 U.S.L. Week 4285, 4288 (1965): "We recognize that, analogous to the
determination of unfair labor practices under § 8(a)(1), when an employer practice
is inherently destructive of employee rights and is not justified by the service of im-
portant business ends, no specific evidence of intent to discourage union membership is
necessary to establish a violation of § 8(a)(3)." See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra
note 10; Gaynor News Co. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954) (a companion case to Radio
Officers, supra note 10), and Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
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the unfair labor practice. " [Wihere the intention proven is merely to bring
about a settlement of a labor dispute on favorable terms, no violation of
§ 8(a) (3) is shown."' 2 In reality, the basic issue was one of approach to the
legality of lockouts and the power of the Board to weigh the effects of a
lockout and conclude that it was so strong a weapon that it upset the balance
of bargaining power between the employer and union. The Court felt that the
Board had exceeded its authority by assuming "general authority to define
national labor policy by balancing the competing interests of labor and
management."'s True, a primary purpose of the NLRA was to eliminate much
of the imbalance between labor and management, but Congress "sought to
accomplish that result by conferring certain affirmative rights on employees
and by placing certain enumerated restrictions on the activities of em-
ployers." 14 The primary purpose of these restrictions was to protect union
organization and collective bargaining. These restrictions are not to be
extended further, and the Court seemed to say that, having allowed the union
to organize and having granted it freedom against discrimination in bargain-
ing, Congress freed the employer and union to use all weapons of economic
warfare to shape the substantive terms of employment. While willing to
guarantee the union the means to organize and to require the employer to
bargain with it, the Supreme Court renounced any liability to insure the
strength of this "ward" of the state, so long as its initial rights are not trans-
gressed. The only balancing open to the Board is that which may be done
within the proper construction of the act.
Mr. Justice Goldberg concurred in the result because of the speciil'facts
of the case. He noted that the employer's business was highly seasonal, with
most ship repair work coming in the winter when the Great Lakes were frozen.
Occasional summer repairs required quick work, so that the customer could
get his ship back in circulation without great loss of time. There was a long
history of striking by the union before each contract. Mr. Justice Goldberg
agreed with the Trial Examiner that the employer held a reasonable belief
that the union would time a strike so as to catch a ship in for repairs or would
wait until the winter to strike. In either case, the work stoppage would be
disastrous to employer and customer alike. Therefore, the lockout was per-
missible to protect against "unusual operational problems or hazards or eco-
nomic loss where there is reasonable ground for believing that a strike [is] ..
threatened or imminent."'' Applying the test of Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB," Justice Goldberg could not find sufficient evidence on the record as
a whole to support the Board's finding that the employer had no reasonable
belief that there would be a strike. The Board was, therefore, not justified in
overturning the Trial Examiner's recommendations. Mr. Justice Goldberg
12
 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 2, 33 U.S.L. Week at 4277. The
term "labor dispute" makes this an unduly broad statement of the problem in this case,
and it may lead to claims that the case supports a lockout to settle a grievance or that a
lockout before impasse in negotiations is justifiable.
13 Id., 33 U.S.L. Week at 4277-78.
14 Id., 33 U.S.L. Week at 4278.
15 Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 121 N,L.R.B. 334, 337, 42 L.R.R.M. 1343, 1345
(1958).
la 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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cautioned against the broad interpretations invited by the Court's opinion,
and urged that lockout cases be decided on a case-by-case basis without laying
down general rules.
Mr. Justice White also concurred, but, to his mind, the facts did not
present a lockout situation. Rather, the employer notified its customers of its
labor problems, so that they would not give it business until the dispute
ended. Then, since there was no work available, it laid off the workers. There
is, Mr. justice White reasoned, certainly no prohibition against laying off em-
ployees for lack of work. As to the majority's lockout discussion, he whole-
heartedly disagreed. He views the NLRA as a broad prohibition against em-
ployer conduct interfering with the rights it guarantees. Since Congress could
not conceivably envision every tactic by which employers would seek to
circumvent the statute, it left it to the Board to apply the general prohibitory
language of the act to secure those rights. The Board, therefore, is entitled to
weigh the effects of economic weapons. If it concludes that a particular
weapon is too potent and gives the employer an unfair advantage, then, to the
extent the employer uses that weapon, it interferes with the employees' pro-
tected rights. Only where unusual facts create sufficient justification to out-
weigh the impairment of employee rights, will the conduct in question be
tolerated. 17
The difference between the majority and Mr. Justice White is basic.
The questions involved are what employee rights are guaranteed and how
far are employees protected in exercising them. It is difficult to understand
why the Court chose so narrow a construction of the act, but it cannot be
said that either the majority or Mr. Justice White is wrong. Nevertheless,
in such a complex, mystifying area of the law, it might have been more
prudent to adopt the case-by-case approach suggested by Mr. Justice Gold-
berg, rather than have to erode a broad rule with unanticipated exceptions.
The same day it decided American Ship Bldg., the Court decided
another lockout case involving many of the same underlying policy con-
siderations. In NLRB v. Brown, 18
 the issue was whether members of a multi-
employer bargaining group might lock out their employees when one member
of the group was struck and continued to operate with temporary replace-
ments until a new collective bargaining agreement was reached. The union
had called a whipsaw strike against only one member of the group (grocery
stores), in order to exert pressure during negotiations. In NLRB v. Local
449, Teamsters (the Buffalo Linen case), 19
 the Supreme Court had permitted
other employers to lock out the union where the struck employer had ceased
operations. It was reasoned there that the lockout was necessary to protect
the integrity of the multi-employer group against the union's "divide and
conquer" tactics. However, the situation in the Brown case was somewhat
different. The struck employer obtained temporary replacements, as was his
right,20 and continued to operate. Then, with the avowed purpose of preserv-
17 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 2, 33 U.S.L. Week at 4278-81.
IS — U.S, —, 33 U.S.L. Week 4285 (1965).
19 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
20 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938),
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ing solidarity, the remaining employers locked out their employees and
continued operations with temporary replacements.
The Board, while recognizing the use of the lockout in whipsaw strikes
and sanctioning the use of temporary replacements in strikes, felt that the
combination was just too much in this case, because it created a bargaining
imbalance and interfered with the employees' right to strike.2 ' Accordingly,
the employers' actions violated sections 8(a) (1) and (3). The Tenth Circuit,
disagreeing that this conduct was in itself unlawful without proof of intent,
refused to enforce the Board's order. 22
The Supreme Court viewed the lockout and temporary replacement as
a defense to the strike, aimed at maintaining the integrity of the multi-
employer group, not at discriminating against the union. Because the grocery
store business is "very competitive and repetitive patronage is highly impor-
tant,"23 the employers were justified in continuing operations after the lock
out.24 In discussing the alleged 8(a) (1) violation, the Court concluded:
Continued operations with the use of temporary replacements may
result in the failure of the whipsaw strike, but this does not mean
that the employers' conduct is demonstrably so destructive of em-
ployee rights or so devoid of significant service to any legitimate
business end that it cannot be tolerated consistently with the Act. 25
It seems that the Court is saying, as it did in American Ship Bldg., that it
will not guarantee the success of the union's bargaining tactics, so long as
the right to use the tactic is not impaired. In examining the section 8(a)(3)
violation, the Court found that "the tendency to discourage union member-
ship is comparatively slight," and that "the employer's conduct is reasonably
adapted to achieve legitimate business ends."28 Thus, the conduct by itself
did not violate section 8(a)(3), and since there was no proof of motivation,
the charge failed.
The Board raised the issue of the competency of the reviewing court to
overturn decisions shaped by the Board's expert judgment. The Court agreed
that when the Board's determination is one of fact, judicial review extends
only to a determination whether the finding is supported by substantial evi-
dence on the record as a whoIe. 27 But in Brown the question was one of
21
 Brown Food Store, 137 N.L.R.B. 73, 50 L.R.R.M. 1046 (1962).
22
 NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7 (1963).
23
 NLRB v. Brown, supra note 18, 33 U.S.L. Week at 4287.
24
 Although the Court did not say so, it was probably important that the
employers' action was necessitated by the union's whipsaw strike tactic. Use of a tactic
which gives strong advantage to the union raises a presumption that it may be offset by
legitimate employer tactics without a guarantee that the union will be as well off as
before the strike.
25 NLRB v. Brown, supra note 18, 33 U.S.L. Week at 4287. The description of
conduct violating section 8(a) (1) as "destructive" is different from the "inherently
discriminatory" language used in American Ship Bldg. and Darlington. However, it
does not appear that the test is different, and it may be that Mr. Justice Brennan
merely wished to emphasize what is meant by "inherently discriminatory." Compare
Mr. Justice White's dissent, saying that the Court by this language created a different
test from that adopted in Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, supra note 10.
20
 Id., 33 U.S.L. Week at 4288.
27 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 16.
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congressional policy and statutory application, and the reviewing court must
test the soundness of the legal foundations of the Board's decision. Since the
Board's concept of balancing economic weapons exceeded the statutory man-
date, the decision was reversed because it rested on "an erroneous legal foun-
dation."28
Mr. Justice Goldberg concurred, limiting his opinion to the specific facts.
He raised the question whether the same result would occur if the non-struck
employers had permanently replaced their employees after the lockout. He
indicated that the decision might be different, despite the majority's broad
language, because the test. of Buffalo Linen is "whether the nonstruck em-
ployer's actions are necessary to counteract the whipsaw effects of the strike
and to preserve the employer bargaining unit." 20
Mr. Justice White dissented because he felt that the Board had not
exceeded its power to balance the conflicting interests of the parties to achieve
bargaining equality. Mr. Justice White saw no necessity for the lockout or
replacement of non-strikers. He interpreted Buffalo Linen as applying only
where the struck employer is forced to close down, and found the substantial
disadvantage, which justified the lockout in Buffalo Linen, absent where the
struck employer continues operations with replacements."
Besides propounding broad policy rules, American Ship Bldg., Brown,
and Darlington also clarify the test for proving a section 8(a) (3) violation.
The basic problem has been to what extent acts tending to show discrimina-
tion against union membership will obviate the necessity to prove subjective
intent to discriminate. The leading case on the question is Radio Officer's
Union v. NLRB, where the Supreme Court said that encouragement or dis-
couragement of union membership must result from discrimination, thus
making the employer's motive relevant to the violation. Furthermore, the
Court said proof of motivation was not necessary where it could be reason-
ably inferred from the nature of the conduct.
This recognition that specific proof of intent is unnecessary where
employer conduct inherently encourages or discourages union mem-
bership is but an application of the common-law rule that a man is
held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct. [Citations
omitted.] Thus an employer's protestations that he did not intend
to encourage or discourage must be unavailing where a natural
consequence of his action was such encouragement or discourage-
ment,3 '
"Moreover the Act does not require that the employees discriminated against
be the ones encouraged for discouraged] for the purpose of violations of
28
 NLRB v. Brown, supra note 18, 33 U.S.L. Week at 4289.
29 Id., 33 U.S.L. Week at 4290.
38
 Mr. Justice White's views are already discussed in relation to the American
Ship Bldg. case, where it was noted that he believes that the Board's function is to strike
a balance which achieves bargaining equality. The majority requires only the protection
of the rights to organize and bargain, and do not view equality as necessary to the
purpose of the act.
31 Supra note 10, at 45.
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§ 8(a) (3). Nor does the act require that this change in employees' `quantum
of desire' to join a union have immediate manifestations." 32 Accordingly, the
Court has found that a no-solicitation clause applying to nonworking hours
violates section 8(a) (3), 33 that an offer of super-seniority to non-strikers dur-
ing a strike was discriminatory, 34
 and that payment of higher wages to union
members in the bargaining unit illegally encouraged union membership."
In all these cases the conduct also violated section 8(a) (1). On the other
hand, without proof of motive, no section 8(a) (3) violation was found where
an employer permanently replaced economic strikers," where the employers
in a group bargaining unit locked out their employees after a whipsaw strike,"
or where the employer abided by a union hiring hall clause." Examination of
these cases reveals that more was involved than a determination whether the
employer's actions were "inherently discriminatory." The test seems to in-
clude consideration of the amount of discrimination vis-à-vis the business
justifications for the acts. Thus, in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB," there
was no business purpose to be served by preventing union solicitation during
nonworking time, and in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.," the
employer's right to continue operations during a strike was adequate justi-
fication for permanent replacement of strikers, so long as the motive was not
to discourage union membership.
In Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB," the Court held that without proof
of motive, it would be unreasonable to infer that a hiring hall clause dis-
criminated by encouraging union membership. Mr. Justice Harlan, in concur-
ring, noted the Board's contention that Radio Officers required only a show-
ing that the tendency to encourage or discourage union membership was
foreseeable to the employer. To this he replied:
It has long been recognized that an employer can make reasonable
businss decisions, unmotivated by an intent to discourage union
membership or protected concerted activities, although the foresee-
able effect of these decisions may be to discourage what the act pro-
tects . 42
Thus, motivation must ordinarily be proved. Mr. Justice Harlan thought
Republic Aviation an exception, because the employer did not show any
"significant business justification" for the particular no-solicitation rule. 43
And Gaynor News was an exception because the action substantially encour-
32 Id. at 51.
33
 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
a4 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra note 10.
35
 Gaynor News Co. v. NLRB, supra note 11.
32
 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., supra note 20.
27
 NLRB v. Local 449, Teamsters, supra note 19,
38
 Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 661 (1961).
39 Supra note 33.
40 Supra note 20. This case seems to have been the first case based on the underlying
policies expounded in American Ship Bldg. and Brawn.
41 Supra note 38.
42 Id. at 679.
43 Id. at 680.
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aged union membership by conferring benefits clearly based only on union
membership." Thus, Mr. Justice Harlan concluded:
[T]he Act was not intended to interfere significantly with those
activities of employer and union which are justified by nondis-
criminatory business purposes, or by nondiscriminatory attempts to
benefit all the represented employees." 45 (Emphasis in original.)
Mr. Justice Harlan wrote the .Darlington opinion, and an examination
of it indicates that the Court has adopted the approach of his concurring
opinion in Local 357, Teamsters.45 The .Darlington opinion and the Brown
and American Ship Bldg. decisions discuss the employer's business justifica-
tion and whether union membership was substantially discouraged. Having
found business justification, but no clear-cut benefit or detriment based on
union membership, the Court has found it necessary to prove anti-union
motivation.47
C. SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
In 1959, Congress amended Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley
Act in order to close several loopholes through which unions had been able
to avoid committing unfair labor practices.' Several recent cases have added
considerably to an understanding of how broadly the new law will be applied.
44 Id. at 681.
45
 Id. at 682.
46 For additional discussion of Darlington, see the section on the employer's decision
to go out of business, supra p. 856.
47 In NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, 379 U.S. 21 (1964), the employer fired two
employees who he believed had threatened to dynamite his plant if they could not suc-
cessfully organize it. The Court said that when an employee is fired for misconduct
arising out of a protected activity, then, despite the employer's good faith, section
8(a) (1) is violated if it is shown that the misconduct never occurred. Since the threats
had not in fact been made, the violation was established. The Court declined to rule on
the charge of a section 8(a) (3) violation.
1 Sections 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) state:
(h) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in any industry affecting commerce to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, man-
ufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is—
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other [person] .
or to cease doing business with any person . . . Provided, That nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where
not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing; Provided
further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in
such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing,
for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and
members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by
an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are
distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an
effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the
primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver,
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In NLRB v. Servette,2
 the union was engaged in a labor dispute with
Servette, a wholesaler. Union representatives went to the local managers of
a retail supermarket chain which carried Servette's products and asked these
managers to discontinue handling the merchandise." In addition, the union
warned that it would distribute handbills in front of the supermarkets asking
customers not to buy Servette's products; some handbills actually were dis-
tributed. The NLRB found no inducement of an "individual" under section
8(b) (4) (i) on the ground that this subsection was not meant to apply to
the market managers, and, no violation of section 8(b) (4) (ii) on the ground
that even if the handbilling was threatening or coercive, it was protected
by the publicity proviso.4
 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that managers
were individuals under subsection (i) and that the publicity proviso was
inapplicable because the products were not "produced" by Servette.'
The Supreme Court, in reversing, seemingly took the best from the pre-
ceding decisions. It stated that a manager is an "individual" under subsection
(i), but that the subsection was not violated because the managers were not
induced "to engage in a refusal in the course of their employment." Sub-
section (i) applies to employment functions, not managerial functions, and,
since it was within their managerial authority to cease dealing with Servette,
the managers were not being induced to withhold their employment services.
The Court then agreed with the Board that no violation of subsection (ii)
had occurred. The publicity proviso applied, because the word "produced,"
properly interpreted, includes distribution as well as manufacture.° Finally,
the warning that the union would distribute handbills was not a "threat"
under subsection (ii); "threaten," apparently, means to threaten an act of
coercion or restraint which, if actually committed, would violate the section.
The key point in Servette is the recognition that whether a person falls
under subsection (1) or (ii) depends, not on his title, but on the functions
he is asked to perform in the particular case. Subsection (i) is meant to apply
to the withholding of an employment service aimed at requiring the secondary
employer to cease doing business with a struck employer. It appears likely
that if the local managers had not had authority to cease carrying Servette's
goods, and if the union had induced them to take Servette's goods off the
shelves, this would have constituted an inducement to withhold employment
services. Subsection (ii) is designed to apply to the employer or some person
or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment
of the employer engaged in such distribution. ..
61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended by 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (13)
(Supp. V, 1964). Subsection (1) is substantially the same as the original Section
8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act with the exception of technical changes. It now
applies to "any individual employed by any person" and a "concerted" refusal is no
longer required. See Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1086 (1960). Subsection (ii) was added in order to protect
secondary employers from direct union pressures.
2 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
a The managers had authority to discontinue handling the merchandise.
4
 Wholesale Delivery Drivers, Local 848, 133 N.L.R.B. 1501, 49 L.R.R.M. 1028
(1961).
5
 Servette, Inc. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 659 (1962).
6
 Supra note 2.
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exercising managerial functions; it is not violated without a showing of
threats, coercion, or restraint.
NLRB v. Local 760, Fruit Packers' dealt with section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B)
and the problem of consumer picketing. The union picketed the retail stores
selling the employer's apples, but took care to emphasize that there was no
dispute with the retailer, and that customers should continue to patronize
its stores. The only appeal was that customers refrain from buying the pri-
mary employer's apples. The NLRB found this picketing violated section
8(b) (4) (ii) (B) because consumer picketing was made illegal per se by the
1959 amendments. 8
 The Supreme Court, however, held that Congress had
not intended to outlaw all consumer picketing. It drew the rather fine dis-
tinction that, if the purpose of the picketing was to persuade persons not to
trade with the secondary employer, the picketing was illegal; whereas picket-
ing aimed solely at persuading persons not to buy the struck product was
permissible. Accordingly, the Court found no unfair union practice.
The Fruit Packers decision is by no means a panacea for all consumer
boycott difficulties; indeed, it raises almost as many problems as it resolves.
The test seems solely to involve the objectives and methods of the union in
pressuring the employer with whom it is in dispute. No attention is given
to the effect on the neutral employer, and this may, in some circumstances,
cause injustice. As Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent asks, is there really any dif-
ference between a boycott of a product which accounts for substantially all
the sales of the neutral employer and a boycott of the neutral employer
himself ?°
A recent decision highlights with great clarity how the NLRB will apply
the Fruit Packers and Servette decisions. In 1961, before the Supreme Court's
pronouncements in Servette and Fruit Packers, the Board held that hand-
billing appeals not to buy made to customers of companies which advertised
products on a television station with which the union had a dispute were
coercive under section 8(b) (4), but that there was no violation because the
publicity proviso exempted the appeals." The Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded in 1962, holding that the proviso did not extend to advertising
services. 1 ' The Board in a supplemental decision first applied Fruit Packers
and found coercion because the union's appeals did not attempt to limit the
boycott only to those products which the companies advertised on television.
However, the Board felt that Servette vindicated its original position that the
publicity proviso applied to any person who enhanced the value of the
product. Consequently, it again found no unfair union practice because of
the proviso. 12 This is a valuable decision because it shows graphically how
narrow the prohibitions on consumer picketing are. Two conditions must be
met: (1) the boycotting activity must fail to distinguish between struck
products and those not involved in the dispute, and (2) the activity must
7 377 U.S. 58 (1964), noted in 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 125 (1964).
8
 Local 760, Fruit Packers, 132 N.L.R.B. 1172, 48 L.R.R.M, 1496 (1961).
o Supra note 7, at 83.
10 Television and Radio Artists, 134 N.L.R.B. 1617, 49 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1961).
11 Great Western Broadcasting Co. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591.
12 Television and Radio Artists, 150 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 58 L.R.R.M. 1019 (1964).
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not be exempted by the publicity proviso, which is acquiring an increasingly
broad interpretation.
In Steelworkers v. NLRB," the issue was whether the union's picketing
was protected by the primary picketing proviso. The union pickets went on
railroad land adjacent to the struck employer (Carrier Corporation) and
patrolled in an effort to force the railroad not to make its usual deliveries
and pickups at Carrier's plant. The Second Circuit, apparently placing heavy
emphasis on the fact that the picketing occurred on railroad property, con-
cluded that it was secondary.' The Supreme Court, in reversing, cited Local
761, Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB'' as holding that loca-
tion is not the sole factor in determining whether picketing is primary or
secondary. The test used by the Court hinges on the type of work being done
by the secondary employees. If the activities picketed relate to the day-to-
day operations of the struck employer, the picketing is primary. If the picket-
ing is aimed at activities which have no bearing on the ordinary business
operations of the struck employer, it is secondary.
D. HOT CARGO CLAUSES
1. Validity of the Clause
When Congress enacted section 8(e) in 1959, outlawing hot cargo clauses
in all but the construction and garment industries,' the move was generally
considered aimed at the Teamsters and other powerful unions which were
using such clauses to force small businessmen to cease dealing with non-union
persons.2 The clause was generally invoked when the union had a primary
dispute with the non-union employer; when neutral employers ceased busi-
ness with him, the powerful economic effect would invariably cause the pri-
18
 376 U.S. 492 (1964).
14 311 F.2d 135 (1962). The decision is criticized in 5 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev.
200 (1963).
15 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
1 Section 8(e) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such
employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using,
selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other
employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract
or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement
shall be to such an extent unenforcible and void: Provided, That nothing in this
subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an
employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcon-
tracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting,
or repair of a building, structure, or other work: Provided further, That for
the purposes of this subsection (e) and section 8(b)(4)(B) the terms "any
employer" ... shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer
... in the apparel and clothing industry: Provided further, That nothing in this
Act shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the fore-
going exception.
73 Stat. 543 (1959) ,, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. V, 1964).
2 Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44
Minn. L. Rev. 257, 272-73 (1959).
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mary employer to accede to union demands. Case law prior to section 8(e)
had made the clause, once obtained, substantially unenforceable.3 Neverthe-
less, in view of the powerful economic potential of the hot cargo clause, it
was decided to make it illegal merely to enter into such an agreement' or
to use coercion to seek to execute the illegal agreement.5
As expected, unions were reluctant to relinquish this power and have
sought loopholes in section 8(e). However, the District of Columbia Circuit,
in Local 413, Teamsters v. NLRB (Brown Transport),° has established the
policy that agreements used to achieve the results viewed as undesirable by
Congress when it passed section 8(e) will violate the hot cargo ban despite
arguments that they are not within the specific prohibition of section 8(e).
This broad approach reflects the extreme distaste with which Congress viewed
the secondary effects of hot cargo clauses and its determination that the ban
should not be evaded by subterfuge.
The opinion of Judge J. Skelly Wright merits extended discussion be-
cause of its thorough handling of a number of types of hot cargo clauses.
Before individual discussion of the clauses, Judge Wright treated the problem
whether a section 8(e) violation was to be determined by the object, effect,
or terms of the clause. He held that "the contract must be tested by its terms,
express or implied."7 This result is undoubtedly correct. An objects test would
place emphasis on subjective intent and require proof of acts from which
the intent could be implied. An effects test also places emphasis on action
taken to enforce the clause. But section 8(e) makes it illegal merely to "enter
into" the clause, and it has been held that a violation is established by
proving existence of the clause without any proof of the party's intent or
attempts to enforce it. 8 Thus, it is proper to test the agreement by its terms
to determine whether they have the effect of requiring the employer to cease
doing business with another person.
The Picket Line Clause. The collective bargaining contract contained a
clause that the employer might not take disciplinary action against an indi-
8
 Local 1976, Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958) (enforcement of clause not
a defense to secondary boycott charge) ; Application of Apex Lumber, 15 Misc. 2d 15,
179 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct, 1958), aff'd, 7 App, Div. 920, 183 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1959)
(injunction to compel arbitration of clause denied).
4 Section 8(e), 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp, V, 1964), quoted
supra note 1.
5
 Section 8(b)i(4) (A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union—
(4) (1) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage
in, a strike or refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials,
or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where
in either case an object thereof is—
(A) Forcing or requiring any employer . to enter into any agreement
which is prohibited by section 8(e).
73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (Supp. V, 1964).
334 F.2d 539, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913, 916 (1964).
7
 Id. at 542.
8 American Feed Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 214, 48 L,R.R.M. 1622 (1961).
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vidual employee who refused to cross any picket line. 9 The Boardl° conceded
that this clause is valid protection of the employee's right to refuse to cross
a primary picket line at the employer's own premises. Also the clause is valid
with respect to a refusal to cross a picket line on another employer's premises
which meets the conditions of the proviso to section 8(b) (4)." But, the
Board said, the clause went too far in sanctioning a refusal to cross a sec-
ondary picket line at the employer's own premises and also by permitting
refusals to cross a picket line on another employer's premises which does
not meet the conditions of the section 8(b) (4) proviso. The circuit court
agreed with the Board except on one point. An employee has the right to
refuse to cross any primary picket line, whether or not it meets the require-
ments of the proviso. In essence, the court was saying that the test for deter-
mining whether the agreement is legal is whether it may have unlawful
secondary effects on a labor dispute. The proviso does not by implication
proscribe those forms of primary picketing that it does not specifically per-
mit, and to the extent that primary picketing goes beyond the proviso, the
clause may validly apply. Beyond that point, when the picket line becomes
secondary, whether at the premises of the contracting employer or elsewhere,
the clause is an invalid authorization of secondary activity.
The Struck Goods Clause. Clause (a) under this section of the contract
read:
It shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall not be a
cause for discharge or disciplinary action if any employee refuses
to perform any service which, but for the existence of a controversy
between a labor union and any other person (whether party to this
Agreement or not), would be performed by the employees of such
person. 12
The court said a refusal to work under this clause would be valid only where
the relationship between the contracting employer and the employer involved
in the labor dispute is so close that they may be considered allies. Quoting
9 Local 413, Teamsters, supra note 6, at 542. The clause states:
It shall not he a violation of this Agreement and it shall not be cause for
discharge or disciplinary action in the event an employee refuses to enter
upon any property involved in a labor dispute or refuses to go through or work
behind any picket line, including the picket line of Unions party to this Agree-
ment and including picket lines at the Employer's place or places of business.
10 The Board's holdings appear in two separate decisions: Local 413, Teamsters,
140 N.L,R.I3, 1474, 52 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1963) ; and Local 728, Teamsters, 140 N.L.R.B.
1436, 52 L.R.R.M. 1258 (1963).
11 The proviso states:
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall be construed to
make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of an employer
(other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged
in a strike ratified . by a representative ... whom such employer is required
to recognize under this Act.
73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 158(b) (4) (Supp. V, 1964).
32 Local 413, Teamsters, supra note 6, at 546.
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from NLRB v. Business Mach. & Office App. Mechanics, 13 the court noted
two requirements for treating employers as economic allies:
1. When the contracting employer knowingly does work which would
otherwise be done by the striking employees of the primary em-
ployer, and
2. When the work is paid for by the primary employer pursuant to
an arrangement enabling it to meet its contractual obligations.
Clause (a) goes beyond the ally doctrine insofar as it permits a refusal to
work even where the second element is lacking. Therefore, to the extent it
authorized a work refusal when the employers were not allies, the clause was
invalid.
Clause (b) of the struck goods section of the contract was clearly a hot
cargo clause permitting individual employees to refuse to handle goods in-
volved in a labor controversy without fear of disciplinary action. However,
the union argued that, read in conjunction with clause (c), it lost its illegal
nature. In clause (c), the employer agreed not to cease doing business with
any other person as a result of individual employees exercising their rights
(in particular the right granted by clause (b)). The court refused to allow
such a promise to affect the status of an agreement plainly illegal under
section 8(e).
The Subcontracting Clause. This clause required the employer to "refrain
from using the services of any person who does not observe the wages, hours
and conditions of employment established by labor unions having jurisdiction
over the type of services performed." 14 The Board had found this clause
illegal because it conditioned subcontracting on the person with whom the
employer might subcontract. The court noted that if the clause conditioned
subcontracting on union recognition (a union signatory clause), it was sec-
ondary in nature and illegal. But if it conditioned subcontracting only on
the maintenance of union standards, it was really a job protection clause
having primary importance between the union and the contracting employer.
Examining the clause, Judge Wright upheld it as a union standards clause
limiting the right to subcontract only to the extent that the subcontractor
must adhere to union wages and conditions of employment. 15
The Hazardous Work Clause. This clause proposed that in the event
the picket line clause should be declared invalid, an employee would recover
additional wages and fringe benefits for incurring the dangers and difficulties
of crossing picket lines." The Board felt that this was essentially a penalty
18
 228 F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956), quoted in
Local 413, Teamsters, supra note 6, at 546.
14 Local 413, Teamsters, supra note 6, at 548. In a footnote the court noted that
its disposition of the clause was based on the assumption that it applied only to work
which would otherwise be done by the bargaining unit.
is In a later case, Judge Wright held that a work allocation clause requiring all
deliveries into Chicago, whether originating within or outside the state, to be made by
local employees was primary in nature. Local 710, Teamsters v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 709
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
to Local 728, Teamsters, supra note 10, 140 N.L.R.B. at 1438, 52 L.R.R.M. at
1260. The hazardous work clause read:
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for the employer's continuance of his regular business, and found another
section 8(e) violation. The circuit court refused to pass judgment because
the clause had been repudiated before drawing up the final contract and be-
cause the issue had not been fully litigated.
Having found section 8(e) violations in the picket line and struck goods
clauses, the court declared those sections void to the extent they exceeded
the legal limits set out in the opinion. Essentially, this might be considered
either rewriting the bargaining contract or defining the limits within which
the various clauses are applicable. In refusing to declare whole clauses or
even the entire contract void, the court kept in mind that part of section
8(e) which makes agreements invalid only to the extent of the illegality.
In addition, the court noted from the general language of the clauses that
the parties apparently intended them to be valid and binding to the maximum
extent legally possible. Thus, the opinion makes the picket line clause valid
where the dispute is primary, the struck goods clause valid where the ally
doctrine applies, and the subcontractor clause valid unless the union attempts
to treat it as a union signatory clause.
In addition to Brown Transport, numerous other cases have dealt with
different aspects of section 8(e), so that there is now a comprehensive body
of law by which to determine whether a clause violates the section. Many
of the cases deal with subcontracting clauses and pertain specifically to the
issue—what is a union signatory clause? When the employer agrees to
"refrain" from dealing with any person "who has not executed this agree-
ment," it is clearly violating section 8(e) by conditioning subcontracting on
unionization." Nor may subcontracting be conditioned on union consent. 18
Use of the word "refrain" instead of "cease" will not make the contract
valid." The courts interpret an "agreement to cease" under the statute as
including the agreement to refrain from doing business with non-union sub-
contractors. An agreement prohibiting all contracting out of work done by
the unit is clearly permissible on the ground that it seeks to preserve job
opportunities and conditions of employment, and thus comes within the area
of primary dispute between the contracting parties. 2°
Another practice which the Board has condemned under section 8(e)
is a clause that employees are not required to work on goods not bearing the
"union label." 2 ' In the construction industry a subcontractor clause is valid,
whether it requires union recognition or merely adherence to union standards.
But the distinction becomes important because the signatory clause may not
be enforced by picketing, threats, or any form of coercion which violates
In the event it shall be finally determined
	 . that employees covered by this
Agreement may be required to make deliveries to, pickups from or enter upon
the premises of any person who is involved in a labor dispute, the Employer
shall provide the following additional benefits in view of the additional hazards
. . . of performing such duties. . .
17
 NLRB v. Joint Council of Teamsters, 338 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1964).
18 Ibid.
19
 Ibid.
20
 Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist., 136 N.L.R.B. 977, 49 L.R.R.M. 1908 (1962).
2 -1
 Carpenters Union, 149 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 57 L.R.R.M. 1341 (1964).
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section 8(b) (4) (B).22 Hence, this clause may be enforced only by legal
means." On the other hand, the union standards clause involves a primary
dispute not subject to the secondary boycott provisions of 8(b) (4). 24
Section 8(e) makes it illegal to "enter into" a hot cargo clause. Recent
cases have given "enter into" an extremely broad definition. Thus, if the
agreement was made before section 8(e) was enacted, it will be a violation
for the union to seek enforcement of the void agreement. Reinstituting the
void clause constitutes "entering into" an agreement. 25
 However, section 8(e)
is not violated if the unfair labor practice charge is brought more than six
months after the making of the agreement and there has been no attempt to
enforce it or comply with it in the previous six months. 2°
Clauses which seek to circumvent section 8(e) by giving individual
employees the right not to handle goods or cross picket lines will be void to
the extent that the same promise by their employer would be void. 27 This
was one of the defenses in Brown Transport; the reasoning was deemed so
transparent as to merit only summary treatment. Since an employer must
work through its employees, such an agreement has the same effect as the
employer itself making the promise. It is no excuse that the employer has
available other persons who may perform the work refused by the employees
in the bargaining unit."
A final point should be emphasized. While a clause on its face may relate
to an area of primary concern between the parties, if the union interprets
it in an illegal manner and attempts to enforce that illegal interpretation,
the conduct will violate section 8 (b) (4) (B) . 2°
2. The Construction Proviso
When Congress enacted the ban on hot cargo clauses, it excluded two
areas of commerce—the garment industry and the construction industry."
The garment industry was specifically excluded not only from the prohibi-
tions of section 8(e) but also from the secondary boycott provisions of
section 8(b) (4). Consequently, in that industry the hot cargo agreement is
22 San Bernardino Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 540 (D.C.
Cir. 1964).
23 Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1964).
24 This was apparently the union's position in Samoff v. Local 542, Operating
Eng'rs, — F. Supp. —, 58 L.R.R.M. 2127 (M.D. Pa. 1964). The district court, needing
only to find probable cause of an unfair labor practice, granted a temporary injunction
pending Board disposition of the case. The agreement required the contractor to make
subcontractors observe the "terms" of the labor agreement. Whether this will be a
union signatory or union standards clause will depend on the Board's interpretation of
what is included in the word "terms."
25 District 9, Machinists v. NLRB, 315 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; Los Angeles
Mailers Union No. 9 v. NLRB, 311 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
26 Teamsters Union, 149 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 57 L.R.R.M. 1223 (1964).
27
 Los Angeles Mailers Union No. 9 v. NLRB, supra note 25.
28 Ibid.
29 NLRB v. Local 753, Milk Wagon Drivers, 335 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1964).
39 Section 8(c), 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. V, 1964), quoted
supra note 1.
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valid, and the union may exert coercive economic pressure to obtain or
enforce the agreement.
The picture in the construction industry is not so clear. First of all, the
proviso exempts only hot cargo agreements relating to the subcontracting of
work to be done on the job site. Thus, an agreement covering materials to
be transported to the job site is not exempted. 31 Also, only "an employer in
the construction industry" may enter the clause. 82 Furthermore, the clause
must relate to subcontracting and not, for instance, to crossing picket lines."
While the construction unions were permitted to enter into hot cargo
agreements, it was understood that the law pertaining to such clauses prior
to 1959 would remain unchanged. The report of the conference committee
states:
The committee of conference does not intend that this proviso
should be construed so as to change the present state of the law
with respect to the validity of this specific type of agreement re-
lating to work to be done at the site of the construction project or
to remove the limitations which the present law imposes with respect
to such agreements. Picketing to enforce such contracts would be
illegal under the Sand Door case. . . . It is not intended that the
proviso change the existing law with respect to judicial enforcement
of these contracts or with respect to the legality of a strike to obtain
such a contract. 84
Reading these statements, one might readily infer that most of the
problems concerning hot cargo clauses were clearly resolved prior to the 1959
amendments. This was far from true. The leading hot cargo case, Local 1976,
Carpenters v. NLRB" (the Sand Door case), established that a hot cargo
clause may not be enforced by conduct such as picketing, striking, or any
other form of economic coercion which would violate the secondary boycott
section. But Sand Door did not specifically comment on whether it was legal
to use coercion to obtain the hot cargo agreement, nor did it refer to the
union's right to seek legal enforcement of the clause on a contractual theory.
However, the Court indicated that, although the union might not use economic
coercion to enforce the clause, it might secure its goal by other means."
a/ Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
2511 (1959). Because the scope of an agreement is not always clearly defined, each
year several cases concerned with whether the clause is limited to the work site are
brought before the Board. E.g., NLRB v. Local 294, Teamsters — F.2d 58 L.R.R.M.
2518 (2d Cir. 1965); Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 150 N.L.R.B. No. 152,
58 L.R.R.M. 1315 (1965); Cement Masons Union, 149 N.L.R.B. No. 111, .57 L.R.R.M.
1471 (1964).
32
 Columbus Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 149 N.L.R.B. No. 117, 57 L.R.R.M.
1465 (1964) (picketing prospective lessee of building under construction for hot
cargo clause held to violate section 8(b) (4)(A)).
33 Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 151 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 58 L.R.R.M.
1440 (1965); Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council, supra note 31.
34 Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, supra note 31, at
2511-12.
ai" Supra note 3.
36 The Court said:
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Thus, despite statements that hot cargo Iaw would continue unchanged in
the construction industry, this area of law suffered from incomplete develop-
ment, and it was left to the courts to continue to develop that law as if
section 8(e) had not been enacted.
One of the major problems was whether picketing or other coercion used
to obtain a valid hot cargo clause would violate section 8(b) (4) (A). That
section prohibits coercion used to obtain "any agreement which is prohibited
by section 8(e)."27 The Board originally took the position in Colson &
Stevens" that picketing to obtain a union signatory clause violated section
8(b) (4) (A). It felt that this result was consistent with the reasoning of
Sand Door, and that if coercion to enforce the agreement was illegal, the
same pressures to obtain it should also be illegal. The Board reached this
decision mainly because of the way it read Sand Door, even though the
majority recognized that it was straining the meaning of sections 8(b) (4) (A)
and 8(e) in doing so. Nevertheless, in order to continue what it believed was
federal policy, it held the construction proviso applicable only to section
8(e) and not to have any limiting effect on section 8(b) (4) (A).
The Ninth Circuit refused to enforce Colson & Stevens" because it felt
that it must read the two sections together. Since the agreement was not illegal
under section 8(e), picketing to obtain it could not be illegal. Following
Colson & Stevens, a number of other circuits reversed Board findings of sec-
tion 8(b) (4) (A) violations based on similar facts."
In Centlivre Village Apts.,41 the Board, in view of the total lack of sup-
port, reversed its position in Colson & Stevens. In numerous recent cases it
has adopted the principle that a section 8(b) (4) (A) violation must rest
on the illegality of the clause under section 8(e). 42 These decisions in no
way affect the prohibitions against enforcement of a hot cargo agreement, 43
nor will they prevent the Board from finding a violation of section 8(b) (4)
(B) where an object of the conduct is to force the employer to cease doing
business with any person, even though it was also the union's objective to
obtain a legal hot cargo clause." As the Board observed in Centlivre:
It does not necessarily follow from the fact that unions cannot invoke the
contractual provision in the manner which they sought to do so in the present
cases that it may not, in some totally different context not now before the
Court, still have legal radiations affecting the relations between the parties.
Id. at 108.
37 Section 8(b) (4) (A), 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (Supp. V,
1964), quoted supra note 5.
38
 Local 383, Laborers, 137 N.L.R.B. 1650, 50 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1962).
39
 Local 383, Laborers v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (1963).
49
 Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636
(3d Cir. 1964) ; Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534
(D.C, Cir. 1964) ; San Bernardino Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, supra note 22.
41 148 N,L.R,B. No. 93, 57 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1964).
42
 Local 36, Roofers, 150 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 58 L.R.R.M. 1259 (1965); Hod
Carriers, 150 N.L.R.B, No. 19, 58 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1964) ; Plasterers Union, 149
N.L.R.B. No. 106, 57 L.R.R.M. 1448 (1964) ; Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 149 N.L.R.B. No. 78, 57 L.R.R.M. 1410 (1964) ; Columbus Bldg. & Trades
Council, 149 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 57 L.R.R.M. 1249 (1964).
43
 E.g., Carpenters Dist. Council v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1964).
44
 Sec cases cited in note 42 supra.
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No different result (under section 8(b) (4) (B) ] is called for because
Respondents by their picketing seek simultaneously to obtain a law-
ful "hot cargo" clause and termination of business relations with a
primary employer . . . rather than first the contract and then the
termination:"
In the area of section 8(b) (4) (B) the Board has recently added a re-
quirement that the object of the coercion be to cause the employer to cease
doing business with an existing and identified subcontractor. 4° This will be
the case every time a union uses coercion to obtain a hot cargo clause, and
the employer at that time has business relations with a non-union subcon-
tractor.47
Assuming that the union successfully obtains a valid hot cargo clause and
conceding that it cannot be enforced by conduct violating section 8(b) (4) (B),
is there some way the union can compel the employer to live up to his agree-
ment? In Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp., 48 the union brought
a breach of contract action under section 301, seeking damages and injunctive
relief. The district court denied relief because it felt that judicial enforcement
would amount to coercion of the employer's exercise of its right freely to
decide whether to engage in a secondary boycott. 49 The Fifth Circuit reversed,
and in so doing exhibited an understanding of Sand Door not found in any
other opinion. The court read Sand Door "as proscribing those pressures
which were statutorily illegal at the time . . . and as having left the ques-
tion of judicial enforcement open."" It felt that cases such as Application
of Apex Lumber" were incorrectly decided because they read into Sand Door
a broad policy discouraging any restraint on the employer's freedom to decide
whether to engage in the secondary boycott. In fact, Sand Door did not pro-
hibit all enforcement of the clause, only enforcement which would violate
the secondary boycott laws. In other words, Sand Door proscribed illegal
coercion in the name of contract enforcement. But judicial enforcement is
not "coercion" in •the sense that the word is used in section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B),52
and it is improbable that Congress would have intended a legal contract
45
 Centlivre Village Apts., supra note 41, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1083.
46
 Plasterers Union, supra note 42.
47
 The union may avoid section 8(b) (4) (B) by seeking a union standards clause
rather than a signatory clause. See discussion of clauses earlier in this section,
48 332 F.2r1 682 (5th Cir. 1964).
49 218 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ala. 1963). The court apparently relied strongly on this
language from Sand Door:
it seems most probable that the freedom of choice for the employer con-
templated by [§ 8(b) (4) (R)1 is a freedom of choice at the time the question
whether to boycott or not arises in a concrete situation. • . Such a choice,
free from the prohibited pressures , . . must as a matter of .federal policy be
available to the secondary employer notwithstanding any private agreement
entered into by the parties.
Local 1976, Carpenters v. NLRB, supra note 3, at 105.
51)
 Local 48, Sheet Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp., supra note 48, at 687.
51 Supra note 3. The New York court enjoined arbitration proceedings on the hot
cargo clause as being a violation of federal policy.
52 See discussion of secondary boycotts, supra p. 878.
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clause to be totally unenforceable. Hence, the circuit court remanded for
further findings.
Little can be said against the interpretation of the law in Hardy Corp.
or in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Colson & Stevens. Under the present
statute it is difficult to conceive how either court might have reached a dif-
ferent result. However, when combined, the two cases entitle the union to
exert all forms of economic pressure it may validly use in a primary dispute
to obtain a clause that is secondary in nature. The clause may then be legally
enforced if the employer balks. This total result can only be justified if there
is some valid consideration affecting the employees' status in the construction
industry which warrants infringement on the rights of non-union subcontrac-
tors to be free from unfair secondary pressures to recognize the union. The
problem appears to be one of job preservation. Employees in construction
unions are employed on a job-to-job basis. They may have several different
employers in a year. By obtaining union signatory clauses, the union is able
to guarantee that the contractor will use its men for the job. In this respect
the clause is primary and protects union jobs. But it also tends to force the
non-union subcontractor to recognize the union. Thus, the ultimate issue is
whether the right of unionized construction workers to this form of job
security outweighs the right of other workers not to be compelled to join the
union in order to get construction work. Perhaps the safest solution is that
if Congress thinks the wrong rights are prevailing, it will change the law.
E. UNION'S DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
On July 1, 1964, the day before the President signed the Civil Rights Act,'
the NLRB handed down a significant decision giving itself broad power to
prevent and eliminate racial discrimination by the statutory bargaining rep-
resentative. In Hughes Tool, 2
 the Board found violations of sections 8(b)
(1) (A), (2), and (3) 8 when a white local failed to process the grievance of
1 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
2 Metal Workers Union, 147 N.L.R.B. No. 166, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964).
s Section 8(b) (I) (A) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7 of this title . . . .
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1)(A) (1958).
Among the rights guaranteed to employees by section 7 is the right "to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing. . ." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
Section 8(b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of [section 8] or to discriminate
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization
has been denied . . . on some ground other than his failure to tender the
periodic dues. • . .
61 Stat, 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1958).
Section 8(b) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the
representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 9(a) of
this title.
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1958).
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a member of the Negro local jointly representing the bargaining unit. A Negro
employee who had applied for an apprenticeship was rejected for white
employees with less seniority. Since under the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the apprenticeships were available only to white workers, only the
white local could process grievances relating to those positions. 4 Consequently,
the Negro employee requested the white local to process his grievance; when
it refused, the Negro local brought unfair labor practice charges and a peti-
tion for decertification.
The Board majority expressly adopted the Trial Examiner's findings:
1. 8(b)(1)(A). The union's refusal to process the employee's
grievance was a refusal, for reasons not related to his qualifications,
to represent him. Consequently, the union was restraining the em-
ployee in his section 7 right "to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of [his} own choosing." The Trial Examiner pointed out
that the apprenticeship contract was no defense because it excluded
members of the unit not eligible for membership in the white local,
and that when a union is responsible for supplying workers for cer-
tain jobs, it owes a duty to represent all unit employees in relation
to these jobs. Discrimination against Negro members violated this
duty.
2. 8(b)(2). The Trial Examiner found a violation of this section
in the "withholding from Davis of treatment which would have been
given to him had he been eligible for membership in local 1. . . ."
3. 8(b)(3). This violation was predicated upon a holding that the
union's duty to bargain runs not only to the employer, but also to
the employees being represented. Since the refusal to process the
grievance was based upon considerations irrelevant to the employee's
qualifications, the section was violated. 5
The Board adopted the above findings in their entirety and in addition
found that the "Board cannot validly render aid under Section 9 of the Act
to a labor organization which discriminates racially when acting as a statu-
tory bargaining representative."° In denying the ability of a union to obtain
or retain certification when it practices racial discrimination, the Board
expressly overruled the line of cases following Atlanta Oak Flooring Co. 7
Then, in accordance with its findings, the Board ordered the union to cease
and desist from further discriminatory practices, and it decertified the union.
Chairman McCulloch and Member Fanning dissented on sections 8(b)
(2) and (3), but concurred on the section 8(b) (1) (A) violation for reasons
different from the majority. They felt that no violations of sections 8(b) (2)
4 The bargaining contract on its face discriminated against Negro members of the
unit and violated sections 8(6)(1) (A), (2) and (3). However, the allegations of the
charging Negro local were not sufficient for such a finding. Hence, the case revolved
around the white local's failure to process the grievance.
5 Metal Workers Union, supra note 2, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1292.
6 Id. at 1294. The Board cited Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
7 62 N.L.R.B. 973, 16 L.R.R.M. 235 (1945). This case adopted a sort of "separate
but equal" locals approach.
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and (3) could be found unless the charge alleged such violations. 8 Further-
more, they said that there was no violation of section 8(b) (2) on the merits
because that section applies only to discrimination related to "union mem-
bership, loyalty, the acknowledgment of union authority or the performance
of union obligations."° Racial discrimination, they urged, does not fit these
categories. As to section 8(b) (3), they maintained that it was intended to
create a duty owing only to employers.
The minority completely disapproved of the holding that a violation
of the duty of fair representation was an unfair labor practice violating
section 8(b) (1) (A). In their view, such a duty was to be enforced only in
the courts. Nevertheless, they found a section 8(b) (1) (A) violation, appar-
ently on the ground that the discrimination was based on nonmembership
considerations, violating the section 7 right to abstain from union activity.
The rulings in Hughes Tool seem likely to affect two types of cases:
those involving racial discrimination and those involving breach of the duty
of fair representation. To a large extent, the former is encompassed by the
latter; racial discrimination, however, raises strong national policy consid-
erations not found in most labor disputes, and so merits separate discussion.
Racial Discrimination. The duty of a statutory bargaining agent not to
engage in racial discrimination was first recognized in Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville Ry.'° That case, involving the Railway Labor Act, arose in the
Alabama state courts, because there was no administrative remedy available
for employees injured by union discrimination." In Syres v. Oil Workers,' 2
the Supreme Court ordered the lower court to consider charges of racial
discrimination under the NLRA. The Court cited Steele and subsequent
cases as creating a federal policy condemning discrimination in labor unions.
In addition to the court remedy, the NLRB had power to decertify a
union whose racial discrimination violated its duty of fair representation."
But racial discrimination was not per se violative of that duty. 14
Hughes Tool seems to have completely changed these remedies. Now, no
union practicing racial discrimination may obtain or retain certification as
statutory bargaining agent. This raises problems, because Board certification
procedures are not generally subject to judicial review. Therefore, the Board
will have exclusive say on questions of racial discrimination in the certifica-
8
 The charge had alleged a violation only of section 8(b) (1) (A). The Trial
Examiner felt that all pertinent issues had been discussed and that the evidence as a whole
warranted his findings of section 8(b) (2) and (3) violations.
9
 Metal Workers Union, supra note 2, 56 L•R.R.M. at 1300. The dissenting
members formulated this position in their dissent to Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
181, 51 L.R.R.M. 158.4 (1962).
1 ° 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
11
 Subsequent cases involving the Railway Labor Act are Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41 (1957); Brotherthood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952);
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
12 350 U.S. 892 (1956) (memorandum).
13
 Larus & Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075, 16 L.R.R.M. 242 (1945).
14
 Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., supra note 7. Certification of segregated locals was
upheld.
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tion context. 13 Such a policy may be approved only if the Board is deemed
to have sufficient expertise to determine what is racial discrimination. In
clear cases, such as denial of union membership or job opportunities, the
Board will have little difficulty finding discrimination. In close cases, how-
ever, it seems unfair to refuse certification when other remedies are avail-
able.' 6
The Hughes Tool holding also raises jurisdictional problems. By finding
that racial discrimination violates the duty of fair representation and is,
therefore, an unfair labor practice, Hughes Tool apparently will bring the
Garmon preemption rule into play." Thus the Board's finding of an unfair
labor practice preempts the field from both federal and state courts, and the
remedy in Syres is no longer available.
Whether or not the Board's remedy will itself be preempted by the Civil
Rights Act cannot yet be determined. The Board takes the position that its
power is in no way limited by Title VII. It bases its reliance on the Senate's
refusal to amend the act by making Title VII the exclusive remedy for
racial complaints,' 8
Briefly, the workings of Title VII will be as follows: It creates the Equal.
Employment Opportunity Commission consisting of five members under the
Department of Labor." Unlawful employment practices by employers,
employment agencies, and labor organizations based on discrimination on
grounds of race, color, religion, sex or national origin are enumerated. 2° The
Commission may act when it receives a complaint, or on its own initiative
when it has reasonable cause to believe a person has violated the act. 21
Subject to certain restrictions, an aggrieved party under the act may com-
mence a civil action in a United States district court when efforts to settle
15 The Leedom v. Kync, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), exception granting judicial review
of legal questions would be unavailable because racial discrimination is a question of fact.
16 On July 2, 1965, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act will take effect and provide
judicial remedies against discrimination in labor.
17 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). It is worth
noting, however, that even with the Board's expansion of its powers to regulate racial
discrimination, its powers in the field of job discrimination are, and will remain, quite
limited. Accordingly, the queston of preemption under the NLRA will arise only in
narrow contexts, such as the certification area. Nevertheless, given the need for elimina-
tion of job discrimination, the urgency for effective action, on both the local and
federal levels, and the multiplicity of federal and state regulation in the area, a
difficult and confusing problem of accommodation of conflicting exercises of authority
lies ahead. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, 372 U.S.
714 (1963), and Note, 5 B.C. Ind, & Com. L. Rev. 458 (1964).
It should also be noted that the Board's power may not be exclusive even in the
unfair labor practice area. Under Humphrey v. Moore and Republic Steel v. Maddox,
an aggrieved employee, after exhausting the contract grievance arbitration procedures,
may sue the union and employer under section 301. See the section on employee rights
under the collective bargaining agreement, supra p. 826.
is Rubber Workers Union, 150 N.L,R.B. No. 18, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964).
1° Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 705(a), 78 Stat. 257,
2° Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 78 Stat. 255. The apprenticeship program en-
countered in Hughes Tool is specifically condemned in section 703(d), 78 Stat. 256.
21 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259.
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a dispute have failed. 22 The Attorney General, also, may bring a civil action
when there is reasonable cause to believe that a person or persons "is engaged
in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights
secured by this title. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) 23 If the court finds an
intentional violation of the act, it may order a wide variety of remedies,
including injunctions, reinstatement of employees, back pay orders and other
appropriate actions. 24
A final problem involved in Hughes Tool is what type of racial discrim-
ination will breach the union's duty of fair representation. Clearly, the
grievances in Hughes Tool dealt with "terms and conditions of employment,"
but what about grievances relating to discriminatory use of plant facilities
and privileges? In Rubber Workers Union, the Board recently held that the
privilege of playing on the plant golf course is a condition of employment,
and that the union was obligated to process the grievance of Negroes denied
that privilege.25 The same case found violations of sections 8(b) (1) (A), (2)
and (3) in the union's refusal to process grievances objecting to the main-
tenance of segregated toilets and showers.
Fair Representation. The union's duty to represent fairly all employees
in the bargaining unit was first recognized in the Steele case,26 and was
extended to unions certified under the NLRA in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB."
Suits for breach of this duty were begun by petitioning a district court 28
without reference to the unfair union practices section of the NLRA enacted
in 1947.23
 Then, in 1962, the Board, in Miranda Fuel Co.," found that a
union's arbitrary reduction of an employee's seniority violated its duty to
represent him fairly and was an unfair labor practice. The Board chose sec-
tion 8(b) (I) (A) as the basis for its discrimination charges. It regarded the
union's discriminatory practice as coercing or restraining employee exercise
of section 7 rights, among which are the rights to bargain collectively and
to refrain from union activities. The duty to represent all employees fairly
arises because section 9(a) makes the union the sole bargaining agent. Since
employees have lost their right to bargain individually, the union representing
them must do so fairly.
Section 8(b) (1) (A) was a somewhat dubious source of a duty of fair
representation. No such duty is mentioned either in the statute or the legis-
lative history. Moreover, NLRB v. Local 639, Teamsters31 (the Curtis case)
makes the holding in Miranda all the more doubtful. Curtis involved recog-
22
 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260. The Attorney General may
intervene if the case is of general public importance.
23
 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 707, 78 Stat. 261.
24
 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g), 78 Stat. 261.
25
 Rubber Workers Union, supra note 18.
20
 Supra note 10.
27
 323 U.S. 248 (1944),
Syres v. Oil Workers, supra note 12; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330 (1953).
29 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended by 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
	 158(b)
(Supp. V, 1964).
30
 140 N.L.R.R. 181, .51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962).
31
 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
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nitional picketing by a minority union after it lost a representation election."
Finding that the purpose of the picketing was to make the employer deal
with the union, the Board concluded that the picketing coerced employees
in their exercise of the right to be representd by a bargaining agent of their
own choosing and thus violated section 8(b) (1 ) (A).33 The Supreme Court
disagreed, finding that section 8(b) (1) (A) "is a grant of power to the Board
limited to authority to proceed against union tactics involving violence,
intimidation, and reprisal or threats thereof. . ." (Emphasis supplied)"
The Second Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order in Miranda,
relying on the Curtis decision and its belief that the only type of discrimina-
tion prevented by sections 8(b) (1 ) (A), (2) and (3) was discrimination
relating to "union membership, loyalty, the acknowledgment of union author-
ity, or the performance of union obligations."" Only one judge spoke directly
on the issue of fair representation, arguing that such a duty, while implicit
in section 9, was not intended by Congress to be read into sections 7 and 8."
He viewed the wrong done as a private tort better remedied by a court than
the Board.
Despite the widely accepted authoritativeness of the Second Circuit, the
Board has shown in Hughes Tool that only an adverse Supreme Court holding
will make it relinquish its theory that breach of the duty of fair representation
is an unfair labor practice." In Maremount Corp., 38 three members, each for
a different reason, found violations of section 8(b) (1) (A). Analyzing the
complex factual situation,' Member Leedom found unfair representation
resulting from racial discrimination. Chairman McCulloch felt that the vio-
lation stemmed from reduction of seniority as punishment for internal political
opposition to the controlling union leaders. Member Jenkins believed that
racial discrimination practiced by members in the Tool and Die unit resulted
2 The particular problem raised in Curtis is now treated by NLRA § 8(b) (7),
73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (Supp. V, 1964).
33 119 N.L.R.B. 232, 41 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1957).
34 NLRB v. Local 639, Teamsters, supra note 31, at 290. This statement on its face
appears to indicate that the Board erred in Miranda, since there were no threats,
intimidation, or violence. But the Curtis case may be distinguished by several factors.
Picketing involves the right of free speech, a right jealously protected by the Supreme
Court. Section 13 of the act states that no section of the act not specifically curtailing
the right to strike may be used to infringe that right. The Court equated the right to
picket to the right to strike. There are no specific statutory limitations on the Board's
power to impose the duty of fair representation.
Bs NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 175 (1963).
36 The court largely adopted the dissent of Board Members McCulloch and Fanning.
37 See Local 1367, Longshoremen, 148 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 57 L.R.R.M. 1083, 1085
(1964), where the Board states this conviction in footnote 7. The major Board decisions
in this area have all been 3-2 with Members McCulloch and Fanning consistently dis-
senting. Thus, a change in Board membership could result in reversal of Miranda and
Hughes Tool.
38 149 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 57 L.R.R.M. 1298 (1964).
39 The Tool and Die section had for years employed only white workers. It had a
long history of political opposition to the group which controlled union bargaining. The
controlling group was half white, half Negro. When the Tool and Die unit was transferred
into the main plant, the members' seniority was reduced on the ground that they were
no longer performing the same work.
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in their own seniority being reduced by controlling union members. Appar-
ently, his reasoning was that one discrimination does not justify another.
Perhaps the most authoritative conclusion that may be drawn from this case
is that conduct of the nature discussed by any of the three opinions will
violate the Board's concept of fair representation.
The broadest approach to fair representation was taken in the Rubber
Workers case,40 already discussed. Here, the Board ordered the union to
process Negroes' grievances covering everything from back pay and separate
seniority rosters to use of the company golf course and integrated toilets.
Another recent case, Tanner Motor Livery, 4 ' held that an employer's
firing of employees who were protesting his racial discrimination violated
section 8(a) (3). This holding was necessarily bottomed on a finding that
the right to protest racial discrimination is a concerted activity protected
by section 7. Thus, the case further develops the Board's proposition that
members of the bargaining unit have the right to be free from discriminatory
treatment and to protest when such treatment exists.
Whether or not the Board's position is to be vindicated awaits the final
word of the Supreme Court. More is at stake than the legal interpretation
of the statute. The heart of the problem is to what extent the Board is
empowered to control the conduct of the bargaining agent it certifies. The
very issue emphasizes a change which has come about in the Board's position
in labor-management problems. Where once the problem was to strengthen
the power of unions by helping them to organize, it now appears that the
emphasis must shift somewhat if the Board is to retain its vitality. More and
more, as union power increases, it becomes necessary to afford some protec-
tion to minority or dissident groups which may not share a common goal
with their statutory representatives. Certainly, the fiduciary duty implicit in
the function of exclusive statutory bargaining agent presupposes a remedy
for its breach. The problem then centers on where the remedy shall be ob-
tained. The answer should not come solely from an examination of legislative
history to see whether the drafters of an act envisioned all the problems which
could arise. Rather, like our Constitution, general laws should be interpreted
in a sufficiently broad manner to obtain results consistent with the needs
of society when the needs arise. The answer is not to require passage of new
law every time a new problem arises. Instead, the most efficient and thorough
legislation designed to cope with social problems should make the administra-
tive board a repository of power from which administrators may draw as a
new problem arises.
Such an approach to the difficulties of fair representation would make
available the processes and remedies of unfair labor practice proceedings,
while leaving review with the courts to insure that substantial justice is done.
It is not satisfactory to dismiss the tort done as being a private wrong. To
do so ignores the fact that the union is an entity certified or licensed by the
government to perform certain functions. When such an entity by its con-
90 Rubber Workers Union, supra note 18.
41
 148 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 57 L.R.R.M. 1170 (1964).
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duct thwarts the purpose of other legislation, it uses power given it by the
government to the detriment of government policies. Hence, the wrong done
has a significant impact on governmental responsibility and is public in nature.
WILLIAM J. MCDONALD
ROBERT M. STEINBACH
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